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Abstract. Designing cryptographic permutations and block ciphers using a substitution-
permutation network (SPN) approach where the nonlinear part does not cover the
entire state has recently gained attention due to favorable implementation character-
istics in various scenarios.
For word-oriented partial SPN (P-SPN) schemes with a fixed linear layer, our goal
is to better understand how the details of the linear layer affect the security of the
construction. In this paper, we derive conditions that allow us to either set up or
prevent attacks based on infinitely long truncated differentials with probability 1.
Our analysis is rather broad compared to earlier independent work on this problem
since we consider (1) both invariant and non-invariant/iterative trails, and (2) trails
with and without active S-boxes.
For these cases, we provide rigorous sufficient and necessary conditions for the matrix
that defines the linear layer to prevent the analyzed attacks. On the practical side,
we present a tool that can determine whether a given linear layer is vulnerable based
on these results. Furthermore, we propose a sufficient condition for the linear layer
that, if satisfied, ensures that no infinitely long truncated differential exists. This
condition is related to the degree and the irreducibility of the minimal polynomial of
the matrix that defines the linear layer.
Besides P-SPN schemes, our observations may also have a crucial impact on the
Hades design strategy, which mixes rounds with full S-box layers and rounds with
partial S-box layers.
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1 Introduction
Modern cryptography developed many techniques that go well beyond solving traditional
confidentiality and authenticity problems in two-party communications. This includes
practical applications of secure multi-party computation (MPC), (fully) homomorphic
encryption (FHE), and zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs using symmetric primitives. Designs
of primitives in symmetric cryptography for these applications are usually led by heuristics
such as simplifying their arithmetic representations or linear operations being more efficient
than nonlinear ones in these scenarios. The latter example is also used in the context
of masking, a widespread countermeasure against side-channel attacks in which all the
computations are performed on shared secrets.
Driven by all these application areas, many new symmetric primitives have recently been
proposed. They include on one hand masking-friendly designs like NOEKEON [DPAR00],
PICARO [PRC12], Zorro [GGNPS13], LS-designs [GLSV14], and candidates from the
currently ongoing effort of choosing a next “lightweight” generation of primitives for e.g. au-
thenticated encryption [BCDM20, DEMS19]. On the other hand, there is an increasing num-
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ber of MPC-/FHE-/ZK-friendly proposals, including LowMC [ARS+15], FLIP [MJSC16],
Kreyvium [CCF+18], Rasta [DEG+18], and Dasta [HL20], MiMC [AGR+16, GRR+16b],
GMiMC [AGP+19], HadesMiMC [GLR+20b], Ciminion [DGGK19], Jarvis and Fri-
day [AD18], Vision and Rescue [AAB+20], and Poseidon [GKR+21].
1.1 Choosing the Linear Layer in Partial SPN Schemes
Some of the recalled designs (e.g., LowMC, Zorro, HadesMiMC and Poseidon) reach
the goal of minimizing the total number of multiplications by making use of rounds
with a partial S-box layer. These designs are called partial substitution-permutation
network (P-SPN) schemes. They are a variant of SPN schemes, in which an input block is
transformed into an output block by applying several alternating rounds of substitution
boxes and affine permutations to provide confusion and diffusion. For a t-word SPN scheme
over a fixed finite field, the substitution layer usually consists of t parallel (independent)
nonlinear functions, called S-boxes. In many cases, the permutation layer is a linear
operation defined by the multiplication of the state with a t× t matrix. In the case of a
partial substitution-permutation network (P-SPN), however, part of the substitution layer
is replaced by an identity mapping, leading to practical advantages for applications in
which nonlinear operations are more expensive than linear operations. This approach was
proposed and applied to AES with Zorro in [GGNPS13]: reducing the number of S-boxes
per round from 16 to only 4 (to compensate, the number of rounds has been increased
to 24). A similar approach has then been considered in LowMC [ARS+15]. LowMC is a
family of block ciphers that combines an incomplete S-box layer with a strong linear layer
to provide security and be competitive in applications like MPC, FHE, or ZK.
Many strategies proposed in the literature to guarantee security for SPN schemes are
no longer applicable to P-SPN schemes and have to be replaced by more ad-hoc approaches.
This includes the well-known wide trail strategy [DR02], which is one of the main techniques
for achieving security against various statistical attacks, as the differential [BS91, BS93]
and linear [Mat93] ones. Instead of choosing larger S-boxes with strong properties, the wide
trail strategy aims to design the linear round transformations so that the minimum number
of active S-boxes over multiple rounds is increased. This strategy is directly applicable in
the case in which the nonlinear layer is (almost) full. In the case in which the nonlinear
layer covers less than half of the state, a dedicated strategy is instead required and tools
such as mixed integer linear programming (MILP) or SAT solvers can be used in order to
find a good estimation of the minimum number of active S-boxes over multiple rounds.1
In the case of Zorro, the heuristic argument proposed by the designers turned out to be
insufficient, as iterative differential and linear characteristics were later found and used to
break the full construction [WWGY14, BDD+15]. Similarly, the authors of LowMC chose
the number of rounds to guarantee that no differential or linear characteristic can cover
the entire function with non-negligible probability. However, they do not provide similarly
strong security arguments against other attack vectors, including algebraic attacks, and
key-recovery attacks on LowMC have thus been found [DLMW15].
A crucial difference between Zorro and LowMC regards the fact that Zorro uses the
same linear layer in all rounds, whereas LowMC uses different pseudo-randomly generated
linear layers for each round. Both these two strategies have their advantages and disad-
vantages. For example, even if the second strategy may provide security against statistical
attacks (as discussed in [ARS+15]), it has some drawbacks. First, the computation time
or memory may become a problem, even when considering the optimizations proposed in
[KPP+17, DKP+19]. Secondly, the security analysis against other attacks may become
harder, since the linear layer is different in each round. Further, a poor (but valid with
1For completeness, we mention that these tools are actually often used/required also in the case in
which the nonlinear layer is full.
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respect to the specification) choice of the linear layers can significantly reduce the security,
as shown concretely in [DLMW15]. Finally, the possibility to have different matrices at
every round can be exploited in order to insert a backdoor, as recently shown in [PW20]
in the case of a tweakable version of LowMC.
1.2 Our Contribution and Related Work
Automated characteristic search tools and dedicated key-recovery algorithms for SP
networks with partial nonlinear layers have been presented in [BDD+15], where the
authors propose generic techniques for differential and linear cryptanalysis. As a main
result, this tool can be used to understand how many rounds a given scheme requires to
be secure. However, focusing on the matrix that defines the fixed linear layer in a P-SPN
scheme like Zorro, it is not clear which properties this matrix must satisfy to prevent
cryptanalytic attacks in general.
Our Goal. While we cannot hope to tackle this question in its generality, we aim at a
relevant subset of undesirable properties that can lead to attacks: infinitely long truncated
differentials with probability 1 [Knu94], or equivalently infinitely long subspace trails
[GRR16a, GRR17], i.e., the existence of a nontrivial subspace U ⊆ Ftq of inputs (where
q = 2n or q = pn for a prime p ≥ 3 and n ∈ N) that is mapped into a proper (affine)
subspace of the state space over any number of rounds.
Impact of Subspace Trails on Hades-Like Schemes. While such a subspace trail on
its own represents a distinguisher (i.e., its existence can be exploited to distinguish the
analyzed P-SPN scheme from a pseudo-random permutation), it can also be the starting
point for an attack. As a concrete example, a preimage attack on the hash function
Poseidon based on the existence of such trails has recently been shown in [BCD+20,
Sect. 6.2]. The attacked hash function is based on the Hades design strategy [GLR+20b],
which uses external rounds with full S-box layers and middle rounds with partial S-box
layers. The linear layer is defined as the multiplication with a fixed MDS matrix, where no
other properties were originally required on such a matrix. Thus, in the case of a “weak”
MDS matrix (i.e., a matrix that does not satisfy the properties proposed in this work), an
attacker can potentially choose an input space of texts for which no S-box is activated
in the rounds with partial S-box layers. This weakness was exploited for the particular
matrices used in [GKR+19, GKR+21], where attacks on the corresponding hash functions
have been found [BCD+20, KR21].
Infinitely Long Subspace Trails: Necessary & Sufficient Conditions for P-SPN Schemes.
We present sufficient and necessary conditions that the matrix defining the linear layer must
satisfy to guarantee that no infinitely long (nontrivial) subspace trails exist. Specifically,
we analyze
(1) the case without active S-boxes in which the input of the S-box is constant, or
equivalently, the input difference is equal to zero (see Section 3 and Section 4), and
(2) the case with active S-boxes in which the input of the S-box can take any possible
value (see Section 6).
In both cases, we work independently of the round keys and round constants, and we show
how to construct an infinitely long subspace trail if it exists. We note that the first case
is independent of the details of the S-box. In the second case, we distinguish between
S-boxes with nontrivial linear structures and S-boxes without them. If the S-boxes do not
have any nontrivial linear structures (which is often the case), the only possible infinitely
long subspace trails with/without active S-boxes are the ones studied in this paper.
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In the particular case in which the matrix is diagonalizable, the infinitely long subspace
trail (if existent) is always related to the eigenspaces of the matrix. This is not surprising
since the relation between the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the linear layer matrix
and the existence of an infinitely long (invariant) subspace trail is already known in the
literature. Such a relation was e.g. pointed out in [AÅBL12], and later on generalized in
[Bey18]. In more detail, the results in [AÅBL12] were found by analyzing the invariant
subspace trails of PRINTcipher (which was presented one year before in [LAAZ11]),
while the result in [Bey18] was found as a generalization and improvement of the nonlinear
invariant subspace attack on Midori-64 [TLS16]. However, all these results focus only on
SPN schemes and invariant subspaces. Consequently, this analysis heavily depends on the
effect of the key (namely, the invariant subspace only holds in the case of weak keys) and,
in general, on the details of the S-box, which is not the case here. For example, if the
subkeys are defined as the sum of the master key and a round constant, the existence of
such an invariant subspace can be prevented by carefully choosing the round constants, as
shown in [BCLR17].
More generally, the infinitely long subspace trails (if existent) are always related to
the invariant subspaces of the matrix M defining the linear layer, namely the subspaces
X that remain invariant when applying the matrix multiplication: M · X = X . These
subspaces can be found via the primary decomposition theorem, which allows splitting the
full space Ftq into a direct sum of invariant and independent subspaces for M . This is
possible by computing the Frobenius normal form of the matrix (as recalled in Section 2).
Besides nontrivial infinitely long invariant subspace trails, our analysis also covers
iterative subspace trails. A subspace trail is invariant if it is related to the invariant
subspaces of M , and not invariant if it is related to the invariant subspaces of M l for l ≥ 2
(where M l 6= µ ·M for each µ ∈ Fq). In the last case, we call the subspace trail iterative.
In both cases, examples are provided to present and support the results.
To summarize, both in the case with active and without active S-boxes, we present
rigorous necessary and sufficient conditions which guarantee that no infinitely long (invari-
ant or iterative) subspace trail exists. As a final result, we can present a sufficient (but in
general not necessary) condition for the linear layer that – if satisfied – ensures that no
infinitely long truncated differential exists. This condition is related to the degree and the
irreducibility of the minimal polynomial of the matrix that defines the linear layer.
Dedicated Tool. Together with our theoretical observations, we also provide practical
Sage implementations based on our results. Given a square matrix, the tool can detect the
vulnerabilities described in this paper (invariant and iterative trails), both in the case with
and without active S-boxes and for binary and prime fields. We make our implementation
available online.2
The tool is split into three different algorithms to cover all our results. The vulnerability
of a single matrix can be evaluated quickly. To better understand the number of vulnerable
matrices for given dimensions and field sizes, we applied our tool to large sets of pseudo-
randomly sampled matrices. These tests show that the number of vulnerable matrices is in
general small (and slightly larger than 10% only in a few particular cases). Details about
the tool and the results are given in Section 5 and Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. We denote the finite fields we are working with by Fq, where q = 2n or
q = pn for a prime p ≥ 3 and n ∈ N. For brevity, and where there is no difference
regarding the results, we abuse the notation F instead of Fq. We denote subspaces with
2https://extgit.iaik.tugraz.at/krypto/linear-layer-tool
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calligraphic letters (e.g., S). Further, we use the superscript notation together with
parentheses to differentiate subspaces with similar properties (e.g., S(i)). Given a subspace
S ⊆ Ft, we denote by Sc ⊆ Ft a complementary subspace such that S ⊕ Sc = Ft. We
recall that two cosets S + a and S + b are equal if and only if a − b ∈ S ⊆ Ft. We use
the symbol ⊕ together with two spaces to denote the direct sum of two spaces. Given
v, w ∈ Ft, the span 〈v, w〉 ⊆ Ft is always defined with respect to the space F, that is,
〈v, w〉 = {α · v+ β ·w | α, β ∈ F}. We denote by {e1, . . . , et} the unit vectors of Ftq (i.e., ei
has a single 1 in the i-th word). Matrices are denoted by non-calligraphic letters. The
entry of a vector x ∈ Ft is denoted by x[i] for i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, while the entry of a matrix
M in the j-th column of the i-th row is denoted by Mi,j . Given an arbitrary subspace
X ⊆ Ft and a matrix M , let M · X := {M · x | x ∈ X}.
2.1 Partial SPN Schemes
In this paper, we will focus on P-SPN block ciphers and permutations over (Ftq,+, ·).3
All our results are independent of the round keys and constants. For this reason, in the
following we do not clearly distinguish between block ciphers and unkeyed permutations,
and we just refer to them using the term schemes.
Partial SPN (P-SPN) Schemes. We denote the application of r rounds of a t-word P-
SPN scheme by Er : Ft → Ft. For every input x = (x1, . . . , xt) ∈ Ft, the output is defined
by Er(x) = (Rr ◦ · · · ◦R1) (x+ c(0)), where Ri : Ft → Ft is defined as Ri(x) = R(x) + c(i)
and c(i) is a publicly known round constant or a secret round key for i ∈ {0, . . . , r}.
Let 1 ≤ s < dt/2e be the number of S-boxes per round.4 We denote by R the
composition of the S-box layer and of the linear layer, i.e., we have R : Ft → Ft with
R(x) = (M ◦ S)(x) = M(S1(x1), . . . , Ss(xs), xs+1, . . . , xt), (1)
where Si : F → F for i ∈ {1, . . . , s} is a nonlinear permutation, and hence t − s input
words are unaffected by the S-box layer, which is the only difference to classical SPN
schemes. We also assume that the s S-boxes are applied to the first s words (note that
given any P-SPN scheme with the S-boxes in fixed positions, it is always possible to find
an equivalent representation such that the S-boxes are applied to the first s words).
The linear layerM(·) is defined by the multiplication with an invertible matrixM ∈ Ft×t,
that is, M(x) = M ·x. In the following, we assume that the matrixM ensures full diffusion
after a finite number of rounds, in the sense that there exists an r ∈ N such that every
word of the internal state after the application of r rounds depends on every input word
x1, . . . , xt. For example, the smallest integer r that satisfies the previous condition for an
MDS matrix is 1, for the linear layer in AES it is 2, while it does not exist for a diagonal
matrix. We refer to [BJK+16a, BJK+16b, App. D] for a more detailed analysis about this
concept.
Before going on, we point out that all word-wise (aligned) P-SPN schemes can be
written in the above way.
Hades-Like Schemes. The recently proposed Hades strategy [GLR+20b] combines both
SPN and partial SPN schemes. In particular, the initial Rf and the final Rf rounds
contain full S-box layers, for a total of RF = 2Rf rounds with full S-box layers. However,
in the middle of the construction, RP rounds with partial S-box layers are used.
3In the case in which q = 2n, the field corresponds to (Ft2n ,⊕, ·), where ⊕ corresponds to the XOR
operation. In order to avoid confusion between the XOR sum and the direct sum, we use the symbol ⊕ to
denote the direct sum only, and we use the symbol + to denote the sum of two elements in Fq .
4Note that if s ≥ dt/2e, then at least one S-box is active every two rounds in the case in which the
linear layer is instantiated with an MDS matrix (namely, a matrix with maximum branch number).
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2.2 Invariant Subspaces and Subspace Trails
Subspace Trails. Subspace trails were first defined in [GRR16a], and they are strictly
related to truncated differential attacks, as shown in [LTW18].
Definition 1 (Subspace Trail). Let (U1, . . . ,Ur+1) denote a collection of r + 1 nontrivial
subspaces with dim(Ui) ≤ dim(Ui+1) < t. If for each i ∈ {1, . . . , r} and for each ai ∈ Ft
there exists ai+1 ∈ Uci+1 such that
Ri(Ui + ai) ⊆ Ui+1 + ai+1,
then (U1, . . . ,Ur+1) is a subspace trail of length r for the function F (·) = Rr ◦ · · · ◦R1(·).
If the relations hold with equality, the subspace trail is called a constant-dimensional
subspace trail.
In the entire paper, we sometimes refer to a subspace trail (U1, . . . ,Ur+1) as a subspace
trail “generated” by U1. Before going on, we mention that the link between truncated
differential trails and subspace trails is recalled in Appendix A.
Invariant Subspace Trails. We use the term “invariant subspace trail” for referring to a
subspace trail in which the subspace is invariant (that is, Ui = Uj for each i, j = 1, . . . , r).
Definition 2 (Invariant Subspace Trail). Let U ⊂ Ft be a subspace. U generates an r-
round invariant subspace trail for the function F (·) = Rr◦· · ·◦R1(·) if for each i ∈ {1, . . . , r}
and for each ai ∈ Ft there exists ai+1 ∈ Uci+1 such that
Ri(U + ai) = U + ai+1.
We point out that this is not the original definition introduced in [LAAZ11] and reconsidered
e.g. in [LMR15]. In these cases, the authors consider SPN schemes, and the existence
of an invariant subspace is related to the existence of weak keys. In particular, given a
weak key k (with k =
(
k(0), . . . , k(r)
)
, where k(j) is the j-th round key), a (nontrivial)
subspace I ⊂ Ft generates an invariant subspace trail of length r for the round function
R(k)(·) = R(·) + k if for each i ∈ {1, . . . , r} there exist a0, a1, . . . , ar ∈ Ft such that
R(k
(i))(I + ai) = R(I + ai) + k(i) = I + ai+1 for each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r− 1}. In our case, this
restriction is not mandatory anymore, and we are free to work independently of the value
of the secret key.
Iterative (Constant-Dimensional) Subspace Trails. We now introduce the concept of
infinitely long iterative (constant-dimensional) subspace trails.
Definition 3 (Iterative Subspace Trail). Let (V1,V2, . . . ,Vl) be a constant-dimensional
subspace trail for l rounds with dim(Vi) < t. We call this subspace trail an infinitely long
iterative (constant-dimensional) subspace trail of period l for the considered scheme if it
repeats itself an arbitrary number of times, i.e., if
(V1,V2, . . . ,Vl,V1,V2, . . . ,Vl, . . . ,V1,V2, . . . ,Vl)
is a subspace trail.
Clearly, an invariant subspace trail is also an iterative subspace trail for the case of
P-SPN schemes (under the previous assumptions), while not every iterative subspace trail
is also an invariant subspace trail. At the same time, the following result holds.
Proposition 1. Working over Ft, let (V1, . . . ,Vl) be an infinitely long iterative subspace
trail of period l. If dim(〈V1, . . . ,Vl〉) < t, then 〈V1, . . . ,Vl〉 generates an infinitely long
invariant subspace trail.
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Proof. The subspace 〈V1, . . . ,Vl〉 is invariant since each coset of Vi is mapped into a coset
of Vi+1 (where each coset of Vl is mapped into a coset of V1).
To the best of our knowledge, no example of infinitely long iterative constant-dimensional
subspace trails for SPN schemes is given in the literature. However, a poor choice of the
linear layer allows to find them for the case of P-SPN schemes.
2.3 Decomposition Theorem & Frobenius Normal Form
In this section, we recall several notions from linear algebra useful for presenting our
results, starting with the concept of eigenvalues and eigenspaces.
Definition 4. Given an invertible matrix M ∈ Ft×t, the subspace P = 〈ρ1, . . . , ρd〉 ⊆ Ft
(with P 6= {0}) is the (right) eigenspace of M for the eigenvalue λ ∈ F\{0} if the condition
M · ρi = λ · ρi is satisfied ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Definition 5. M ∈ Ft×t is a diagonalizable matrix if and only if there exists an (invertible)
matrix P ∈ Ft×t and there exist λ1, . . . , λt ∈ Ft such that P−1·M ·P = D = diag(λ1, . . . , λt)
is a diagonal matrix.
Definition 6. A field F is algebraically closed if every nonconstant polynomial in F[x] has
a root in F.
Definition 7. Let M ∈ Ft×t be an invertible matrix. The characteristic polynomial
ψ ∈ F[x] is defined as ψ(x) = det(x · I −M). The minimal polynomial φ ∈ F[x] is the
monic polynomial of minimal degree such that
(1) φ(M) · v = 0t = (0, 0, . . . , 0)T ∈ Ft for each v ∈ Ft, and
(2) for each polynomial p ∈ F[x] that is annihilating (in the sense that p(M) · v = 0t for
each v ∈ Ft), φ divides p.
Proposition 2 ([Kai08, Theorem 1]). Let M ∈ Ft×t be an invertible matrix with the
minimal polynomial φ. There exists (at least) one vector v ∈ Ft such that
v,M · v,M2 · v, . . . ,Mdeg(φ)−1 · v
are linearly independent.
By definition, det(M) = (−1)t · ψ(0). Moreover,
(1) the minimal polynomial divides the characteristic polynomial (which implies that
deg(φ) ≤ deg(ψ) = t), and
(2) an eigenvalue of the matrix is a root of both the minimal and of the characteristic
polynomial, and vice-versa (i.e., each root is an eigenvalue).
Definition 8. Let M ∈ Ft×t be an invertible matrix and let V ⊆ Ft be a subspace. V is
said to be M -invariant if and only if M · V = V.
Definition 9. Let M ∈ Ft×t be an invertible matrix and let V ⊆ Ft be a subspace.
• V is said to be directly indecomposable if there are no nontrivial subspaces V1,V2 ⊆ V
such that V = V1 ⊕ V2.
• V is said to be cyclic if ∃v ∈ V such that V = 〈v,M ·v,M2 ·v, . . . ,M l ·v, . . . 〉 ≡ 〈v〉M .
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As is well-known, not all matrices are diagonalizable. When working over a field F,
there always exists an invertible matrix Q ∈ Ft×t such that F := Q−1 ·M · Q is in the
Frobenius normal form. The Frobenius normal form can be exploited to easily compute the
characteristic and the minimal polynomial of a given matrix. It can also be used to split
the full space Ft into independent subspaces that are invariant through the matrix M .
Definition 10. Let M ∈ Ft×t. The Frobenius normal form of M is the matrix F ∈ Ft×t
for which there exists an invertible matrix Q ∈ Ft×t such that
F = Q×M ×Q−1 = diag(C1, C2, . . . , Cl) =

C0 0 . . . 0 0




0 0 . . . Cl−1 0
0 0 . . . 0 Cl

for 1 ≤ l ≤ t, where Ci ∈ Fti×ti is the (invertible) companion matrix
Ci =

0 0 . . . 0 −c0,i
1 0 . . . 0 −c1,i




0 0 . . . 1 −cti−1,i

associated to the monic polynomial pi(x) = xti +
∑ti−1
j=0 cj,i · xj such that
(1) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1 the polynomial pi divides the polynomial pi+1, and
(2) pl corresponds to the minimal polynomial φ of M and ψ(x) =
∏l
i=0 pi(x) is the
characteristic polynomial of M .
Note that given a companion matrix Ci over Fti , we have that 〈e1〉Ci generates the
full subspace Fti , since pi(e1) = e2, pi(e2) = e3, . . . , pi(eti−2) = eti−1, pi(eti−1) = eti are
linearly independent, while pi(eti) = −c0,i · e1 − c1,i · e2 + · · · − cti−1,i · eti .
Theorem 1 (Primary Decomposition Theorem [Hog16, Sect. 6.4] - [Kai08, Theorem 3]).
Let M ∈ Ft×t be an invertible matrix. Let φ ∈ F[x] be its minimal polynomial such that
φ(x) = [p1(x)]α1 · [p2(x)]α2 · · · · · [pm(x)]αm ,
where αi ≥ 1 and pi(·), pj(·) are monic, irreducible, and relatively prime. The subspace Ft
can be rewritten as a direct sum decomposition
Ft = A1 ⊕A2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Am, (2)
where for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
Aj := ker([pj(M)]αj ) :=
x ∈ Ft
∣∣∣∣∣∣ [pj(M)]αj · x = 0 || 0 || · · · || 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡0t
 ,
(where ker(X) is the kernel of the matrix X ∈ Ft×t) such that
1. Ai are M -invariant for each i, and
2. the minimal polynomial of a linear operator Mi induced on Ai by M is (pi(·))αi .
We emphasize that the previous decomposition does not imply that there are no
nontrivial subspaces of Ai that are M -invariant. For example, consider a 3 × 3 matrix
M = diag(1, 1, 2). In such a case the minimal polynomial is φ(x) = (x − 1) · (x − 2),
and F3 = A1 ⊕ A2, where A1 = 〈e1, e2〉 and A2 = 〈e3〉. At the same time, while A2 is
“irreducible”, it is easy to find subspaces of A1 that are invariant through M , namely all
subspaces of dimension one of the form A′1 = 〈α · e1 + β · e2〉 for α, β ∈ F.
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3 Infinitely Long Invariant Subspace Trails for P-SPN
Schemes (Without Active S-Boxes)
Focusing on P-SPN schemes which use the same linear layer in each round (e.g., Zorro
[GGNPS13]), here we study the properties that the matrix that defines the linear layer
must satisfy in order to prevent infinitely long invariant subspace trails without active
S-boxes.
3.1 Preliminary Results
Due to the fact that the nonlinear layer is only partial in P-SPN schemes, parts of the
state go through the S-box layer unchanged. In particular, if the nonlinear layer consists
of s ≥ 1 S-boxes (applied to the first s words) and t − s ≥ 1 identity functions, it is













≥ 1 if and only if s < dt/2e. Indeed, if the
matrix that defines the linear layer has maximum branch number and if s ≥ dt/2e, then at
least one S-box is active every two rounds (however, since s < t, then it is always possible
to choose the initial subspace such that no S-box is active in the first round).
By choosing texts in the same coset of S = 〈v1, . . . , vdim(S)〉 such that
∀i ∈
{





: (M i−1 · vj)[1, 2, . . . , s] = 0 || 0 || · · · || 0 ∈ Fs
for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,dim (S)} and where M0 = I is the identity matrix, no S-box is active







rounds. We formalize this result in the following definition.
Definition 11. Consider the case of a P-SPN scheme over Ft with 1 ≤ s < t S-boxes
applied to the first s words defined as in Eq. (1). Let S(i) ⊆ Ft be defined as
S(i) =
{
Ft if i = 0,{
v ∈ Ft
∣∣ (M j · v)[1, . . . , s] = 0 || · · · || 0∈ Fs, 0 ≤ j < i} otherwise. (3)
Lemma 1. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes applied to the first s words




∣∣∣ (M · v)[1, . . . , s] = 0 || · · · || 0∈ Fs} = S(i) ∩ (M−1 · S(i)) ⊆ S(i),





Proof. Let x ∈ S(1). By definition, x ∈ S(2) if and only if
x ∈ S(1) ∩ {y ∈ Ft | (M · y)[1, . . . , s] = 0 || · · · || 0 ∈ Fs},
or equivalently, if x ∈
{
v ∈ Ft
∣∣ (M j · v)[1, . . . , s] = 0 || · · · || 0∈ Fs, j ∈ {0, 1}}. Since
{y ∈ Ft | (M · y)[1, . . . , s] = 0 || · · · || 0 ∈ Fs}
= {(M−1 · z) ∈ Ft | z[1, . . . , s] = 0 || · · · || 0 ∈ Fs}
= M−1 · {z ∈ Ft | z[1, . . . , s] = 0 || · · · || 0 ∈ Fs}
= M−1 · S(1),
it follows that S(2) = S(1) ∩M−1 · S(1). Working recursively, x ∈ S(i+1) if and only if
x ∈
{
v ∈ Ft | (M j · v)[1, . . . , s] = 0 || · · · || 0∈ Fs, 0 ≤ j ≤ i
}
, that is, if x ∈ S(i) ∩ {y ∈
S(i) | (M · y)[1, . . . , s] = 0 || · · · || 0 ∈ Fs}. It follows that S(i+1) = S(i) ∩M−1 · S(i).
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Moreover, the following result holds.
Lemma 2. Consider the case of a P-SPN scheme over Ft with 1 ≤ s < t S-boxes applied



















≥ 1 for each r ≥ 1). For each r ≤ R, the collection(
S(r),M · S(r),M2 · S(r), . . . ,Mr−1 · S(r)
)
is a subspace trail for the first r rounds generated by S(r) without active S-boxes.
Proof.
(
S(r),M · S(r),M2 · S(r), . . . ,Mr−1 · S(r)
)
is a subspace trail if for each i ∈ {0, 1,
. . . , r−1} and for each a ∈ Ft, there exists b ∈ Ft such that R(M i ·S(r)+a) = M i+1 ·S(r)+b.
By definition of the round function R(x) = c+M ◦ S(x):
• The S-box layer only changes the coset. Indeed, the first s words of M i · S(r) + a
are constant, due to the definition of S(r) and due to the fact that the S-box
layer is composed of s nonlinear functions and t − s identity functions. Hence,
S(M i · S(r) + a) = M i · S(r) + a′ for a certain a′ ∈ Ft.
• Since the linear layer is a linear operation, M · (M i · S(r) + a′) = M i+1 · S(r) + a′′ .
• Finally, the last key or constant addition only changes the coset.
This well-known result (see e.g. [ARS+15, Sect. 5.1] or [GGNPS13, Sect. 4.1]) does
not require any assumption on the matrix M that defines the linear layer. In the following,
we will explore in which cases it is possible to set up an infinitely long subspace trail. In
order to do this, we start by reconsidering some results already published in the literature.
3.2 Infinitely Long Invariant Subspace Trails via Eigenspaces of M
As it is well-known in the literature [AÅBL12, Bey18], invariant subspace trails can be set
up by exploiting the eigenspaces of the matrix M that defines the linear layer.
Proposition 3. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes per round defined as in
Eq. (1), let M ∈ Ft×t be the invertible matrix defining the linear layer. Let λ1, . . . , λτ ∈ F





es+1, . . . , et
〉
, . . . ,Pτ ∩
〈
es+1, . . . , et
〉〉
.
If 1 ≤ dim(I) < t, then I ⊆ Ft generates a (nontrivial) infinitely long invariant subspace
trail without active S-boxes.
Proof. To prove the previous result, we have to show that for each a ∈ Ft there exists b ∈ Ft
such that M ◦ S(I + a) = I + b. Hence, we omit the key and constant additions since they
only change the coset. First of all, note that no S-box is active since I ⊆
〈
es+1, . . . , et
〉
, and
thus only the coset changes through the S-box layer. Secondly, since Pi is an eigenspace
of the linear layer M for each i ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, it follows that Pi ∩
〈
es+1, . . . , et
〉
remains
invariant through it. The result follows immediately.
Examples. Consider a P-SPN scheme over F4p with s = 1 for a prime p ≥ 101. If the
4× 4 matrix M is
M =

4 4 5 1
1 3 5 3
3 2 4 1
4 1 4 4
 ,
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then I = 〈(0, 1,−1, 1)T 〉 generates an infinitely long invariant subspace trail. Indeed, note
that (0, 1,−1, 1)T is an eigenvector of M and 〈(0, 1,−1, 1)T 〉∩〈e2, e3, e4〉 = 〈(0, 1,−1, 1)T 〉.
Hence, this is a concrete example of the result given in the previous theorem, and it is
independent of the branch number of M (e.g., such a 4× 4 matrix is MDS matrix for each
p ≥ 101). As a second example, if
M = circ(2, 3, 1, 1) =

2 3 1 1
3 1 1 2
1 1 2 3
1 2 3 1
 ,
the only eigenspace are given by 〈(1, 1, 1, 1)T 〉 and 〈(1,−1, 1,−1)T 〉 (with eigenvalues equal
to 7 and −1, respectively). Neither of them satisfies the results of the theorem just given.
Hence, there exist matrices which provide security against invariant subspace trails without
active S-boxes even if they have eigenspaces.
3.3 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for the Existence of Infinitely
Long Invariant Subspace Trails (Without Active S-boxes)
As shown in Section 2.3, a subspace does not have to be an eigenspace of a matrix M in
order to be M -invariant. In particular, as we have seen in Theorem 1, the space Ft can be
rewritten as a direct sum decomposition Ft = A1 ⊕A2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Am, where – among other
properties – all subspaces Ai are M -invariant. Here we generalize the previous result by
replacing the eigenspaces of the matrix with the subspaces Ai, which lead us to a necessary
and sufficient condition.
Theorem 2. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes defined as in Eq. (1), let
M ∈ Ft×t be the invertible matrix that defines the linear layer. A subspace I, where
1 ≤ dim(I) < t, generates an infinitely long invariant subspace trail without active S-boxes





Proof. We work with differences. That is, instead of proving that each coset of I is mapped
into a coset of I after one round, we are going to prove that given two elements in the
same coset of I (namely, an input difference in I), then the corresponding output elements
are still in the same coset of I (namely, the output difference lies in I), i.e., given x, y ∈ Ft,
Prob(R(x)−R(y) ∈ I | x− y ∈ I) = 1. We use this approach in the entire paper.
The fact that a subspace I ⊆ S(1) such that I = M · I generates an infinitely long
invariant subspace trail without active S-boxes is trivial. Indeed, the definition of S(1)
(which implies that no S-box is active) together with the fact that I = M · I implies the
result. Vice-versa, here we show that given an infinitely long invariant subspace trail I
without active S-boxes, it must satisfy I ⊆ S(1) and I = M · I. To do this, observe that
all pairs of texts which do not activate any S-box in the next round are in the same coset
of S(1) (by its definition). Focusing on the linear layer, note that a subspace X is invariant
if and only if M · X = X . The result follows immediately.




. Since I ⊆ S(1), it follows that (M · I) ⊆
(M · S(1)), where M is a linear operation. As a result, I ⊆ (M · S(1)) since I = M · I.
Theorem 3. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes defined as in Eq. (1), let
M ∈ Ft×t be the invertible matrix that defines the linear layer. Let {A1, . . . ,Am} be
the primary decomposition of Ft with respect to the matrix M , as defined in Theorem 1,
i.e., a collection of M-invariant independent subspaces in Ft such that Ft =
⊕
iAi. Let
{X1, . . . ,Xm} be a collection of subspaces defined as
Xi := Ai ∩ 〈es+1, . . . , et〉. (4)
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A subspace I, where 1 ≤ dim(I) < t, generates an infinitely long invariant subspace trail
without active S-boxes if and only if
I = 〈P1,P2, . . . ,Pm〉,
where Pi ⊆ Xi is an M -invariant subspace. In particular, Pi ⊆ Xi ∩ (M · Xi).
Note that the condition Ai ∩ 〈es+1, . . . , et〉 can be replaced by the condition Ai ∩ S(1).
Proof. Proving that I = 〈P1,P2, . . . ,Pm〉 generates an infinitely long invariant subspace
trail without active S-boxes is trivial. Indeed, by definition of Pi, no S-box is active (since
Pi ⊆ Xi ⊆ 〈es+1, . . . , et〉 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}). The fact that I is M -invariant follows from
the fact that all Pi are M -invariant subspaces of Xi (by assumption). Hence, every input
difference in I is mapped into an output difference in I.
Vice-versa, assume that I generates an infinitely long invariant subspace trail without
active S-boxes. Let
Pi := Ai ∩ I.
Obviously, all Pi are subspaces. First of all, note that all Pi are subspaces of 〈es+1, . . . , et〉,
since no S-box is active by definition of I. Indeed, if there exists a nontrivial Pi such
that Pi ∩ 〈e1, . . . , es〉 6= {0}, then eventually at least one S-box is active (remember that
we are working with differences and that I generates an infinitely long subspace trail),
which contradicts the assumption that no S-box is active. Secondly, note that Pi ⊆ Ai is
M -invariant. Indeed, if x ∈ Pi, thenM ·x belongs to Ai (since Ai isM -invariant) and to I
(since it generates an infinitely long subspace trail), which implies thatM ·x ∈ (Ai∩I) = Pi.
Moreover, I = 〈P1,P2, . . . ,Pm〉 since Ai ∩ Aj = {0} for i 6= j, and since Ft =
⊕
iAi.
Finally, Pi ⊆ Xi ∩ (M · Xi) follows from the fact that Pi ⊆ Xi and Pi = M · Pi, as in
the proof of Theorem 2.
Proposition 4. Under the assumptions of the previous theorem, let X (0)i := Ai ∩
〈es+1, . . . , et〉. For j ≥ 1, we define




M · X (j−1)i
)
.
Let li ≥ 0 be the smallest (finite) integer such that X (li)i = X
(li+1)
i . The biggestM -invariant
subspace Pi of Xi that satisfies Theorem 3 is equal to X (li)i .
Proof. All X (j)i are subspaces of X
(0)
i ⊆ Ai, where Ai is invariant underM by construction.
Hence, either dim(X (j)i ) < dim(X
(j−1)
i ) or dim(X
(j)
i ) = dim(X
(j−1)
i ). If dim(X
(j)
i ) =




i . Indeed, note that dim
(









M · X (j−1)i
)
, which implies that X (j)i = X
(j−1)
i . By
construction, this is the biggest M -invariant subspace of Ai ∩ 〈es+1, . . . , et〉.
Finally, note that the index li such that X (j)i = X
(j+1)
i for each j ≥ li is always finite.
Indeed, in the case in which dim(X (j)i ) < dim(X
(j−1)
i ) for each j < li, we have that




i 6= {0} for
each j ≥ li. In both cases, li is at most equal to the dimension of X (0)i , since at each step
the dimension of X (j)i either remains constant or decreases by 1.
Corollary 1. The infinitely long invariant subspace trail without active S-boxes presented
in Proposition 3 satisfies Theorem 3. The two results are equivalent if the matrix is
diagonalizable.
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Proof. The invariant subspace considered in Proposition 3 is equal to the one considered
in Theorem 3 under the condition
Pi =
{
Xi if Xi is an eigenspace of M,
{0} otherwise.
This concludes the proof.
Before going on, we highlight that Theorem 3 and Proposition 3 are not equivalent, in
the sense that there are matrices M that admit infinitely long invariant subspace trails
which are independent of their eigenspaces. A concrete example is given by the Cauchy
matrix M generated as in [GKR+19, GKR+21] (recalled in Section 4.1) for t = 24 and
F2n , where n = 63. As shown in [KR21, Page 20], the subspace S(5) defined as in Eq. (3)
satisfies M · S(5) = S(5) and (M ·x)[1] = 0 for all x ∈ S(5). At the same time, the subspace
S(5) is not related to any eigenspaces of M j for j ∈ {1, . . . , 5}.
4 Iterative Subspace Trails Without Active S-Boxes
The previous results can be generalized to obtain a necessary and sufficient condition
regarding the existence of infinitely long iterative subspace trails without active S-boxes.
Proposition 5. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes defined as in Eq. (1),
let M ∈ Ft×t be the invertible matrix that defines the linear layer. A subspace I, where
1 ≤ dim(I) < t, generates an infinitely long iterative (non-invariant) subspace trail of
period l ≥ 2 without active S-boxes if and only if I ⊆ S(l) and I =
(
M l · I
)
. In particular,
I ⊆ S(l) ∩
(
M l · S(l)
)
.5
The proof is a simple generalization of the one given for Theorem 2.
Proposition 6. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes defined as in Eq. (1), let
M ∈ Ft×t be the invertible matrix that defines the linear layer. Let {A(l)1 ,A
(l)
2 , . . . ,A
(l)
m }
be the primary decomposition of Ft with respect to the matrix M l, as defined in Theorem 1,





For each l ≥ 2, let {X1, . . . ,Xm} be a collection of subspaces defined as
Xi := A(l)i ∩ S(l).
A subspace I, where 1 ≤ dim(I) < t, generates an infinitely long iterative subspace
trail without active S-boxes of period l ≥ 2 if and only if
I = 〈P1,P2, . . . ,Pm〉,
where Pi ⊆ Xi is a subspace that is M l-invariant. In particular, Pi ⊆ Xi ∩
(
M l · Xi
)
.
Proof. The proof of this result is equivalent to the one given in Theorem 3. In particular,
the condition Pi ⊆ S(l) guarantees that no S-box is active in (I,M · I, . . . ,M l−1 · I) by
definition of S(l), and the subspace I is l-round invariant, since each subspace A(l)i is
M l-invariant.
5In order to simplify the notation, we use I to denote either an invariant subspace trail or an iterative
subspace trail. The period of the trail is clear from the context.
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Connection to the Existence of Invariant Subspace Trails. One may wonder if there
exists an example of a P-SPN scheme for which there exists no infinitely long invariant
subspace trail, but at the same time there exists an infinitely long iterative subspace trail
without active S-boxes. As we are going to show, this is not possible.
Proposition 7. Consider a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes defined as in Eq. (1).
An infinitely long iterative subspace trail without active S-boxes can only exist if there exists
an infinitely long invariant subspace trail without active S-boxes.
Proof. As shown in Proposition 1, let (V1, . . . ,Vl) be an infinitely long iterative subspace
trail of period l (without active S-boxes). If dim(〈V1, . . . ,Vl〉) < t, then 〈V1, . . . ,Vl〉
generates an infinitely long invariant subspace trail. Hence, if dim(〈V1, . . . ,Vl〉) = t, it
would be possible that an iterative subspace trail without active S-boxes exists and at the
same time no invariant subspace trail exists. However, note that dim(〈V1, . . . ,Vl〉) = t can
never occur in the case without active S-boxes. Indeed, since Vi ⊆ 〈es+1, . . . , et〉 for each i ∈
{1, . . . , l} (to guarantee that no S-box is active), it follows that 〈V1, . . . ,Vl〉 ⊆ 〈es+1, . . . , et〉
can never generate the full space Ft (indeed, 〈V1, . . . ,Vl〉 ∩ 〈e1, . . . , es〉 = {0}).
This does not mean that iterative subspace trails without active S-boxes are useless.
Indeed, let (V1, . . . ,Vl) be an infinitely long iterative subspace trail of period l without
active S-boxes. If dim(Vi) < dim(〈V1, . . . ,Vl〉) (note: strictly less), then the data cost
of setting up the iterative subspace trail may be smaller than the cost of setting up an
invariant subspace trail. This can be crucial in scenarios in which there is a limitation on
the data allowed for an attack.
4.1 Linear Layers with Low Multiplicative Order
As a first concrete example, we consider the case of a linear layer defined via a matrix with
low multiplicative order.
Definition 12. Let M ∈ Ft×t be an invertible matrix. M has a multiplicative order equal
to l ≥ 1 if and only if l is the smallest (positive) integer for which there exists µ ∈ F \ {0}
such that M l = µ · I, where I ∈ Ft×t is the identity matrix.
Proposition 8. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft defined as in Eq. (1), let M ∈ Ft×t be
the invertible matrix defining the linear layer. If the multiplicative order of M is l such






as in Lemma 2, then S(l) generates an infinitely long iterative subspace trail of period l.
Proof. To prove the result, it is sufficient to see that
(
S(l),M · S(l), . . . ,M l−1 · S(l)
)
is an
iterative subspace trail without active S-boxes. This is a consequence of the fact that
M l ·S(l) = µ ·I ·S(l) = S(l), and because no S-boxes are active by the definition of S(l).
Cauchy Matrices in [GKR+21] – An Example from the Literature. An example has
recently been pointed out in [KR21] and [BCD+20]. In these papers, the authors focus on
the Cauchy matrix M ∈ (F2n)t×t proposed in [GKR+21] and defined as
Mi,j =
1
xi + xj + r
, (5)
where xi = i− 1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , t} and t ≤ r ≤ p− t. Such a matrix is used as the linear
layer of some Hades-like permutations, namely Starkadπ and Poseidonπ [GKR+21].
In [YMT97, Sect. 3.2] and in [KR21, BCD+20], the authors prove that if t = 2τ , the
previous matrix has a multiplicative order equal to 2, namely that M2 is a multiple of
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the identity.6 Hence, the previous result applies perfectly to this case. For the concrete
definition of such a subspace we refer to [KR21, Sect. 5.2].
4.2 Linear Layers with Low-Degree Minimal Polynomials
As we have just seen, a matrix M has a low multiplicative order if there exists a small l
such that M l = µ · I, or equivalently M l − µ · I = 0. Given the polynomial p(x) = xl − µ,
it is easy to see that p(·) annihilates the entire space, since
∀v ∈ Ft : p(M) · v = (M l − µI) · v = 0t×t · v = 0t.
Hence, the minimal polynomial of M divides p(·). A generalization of the previous result
is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft defined as in Eq. (1), let M ∈ Ft×t be
the invertible matrix that defines the linear layer. Let φ be the minimal polynomial of M ,





is defined as in Lemma 2). Moreover, let 1 ≤ h ≤ l be a divisor of l (and let l′ ≥ 1 such
that l = l′ · h). Assume that the minimal polynomial is of the form
φ(x) = xl +
l′−1∑
i=1
αi·h · xi·h + α0, (6)
i.e., only monomials whose exponents are a multiple of h appear. Let us define I as
I = 〈S(l),Mh · S(l),M2h · S(l), . . . ,M l−h · S(l)〉,
where S(l) is defined as in Eq. (3). If 1 ≤ dim(I) < t, I generates an infinitely long
iterative subspace trail of period h (invariant if h = 1) without active S-boxes.
Note that the special case h = l corresponds to the one presented in Proposition 8.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one already presented in Proposition 8, noting that:
1. ∀i = 0, 1, . . . , h− 1: M i · I ∈ 〈M i · S(l),Mh+i · S(l),M2h+i · S(l), . . . ,M l−h+i · S(l)〉.
2. Mh · I ∈ 〈S(l),Mh · S(l),M2h · S(l), . . . ,M l−h · S(l)〉 follows from the fact that
φ(M) = 0 (hence, M l = −
∑l′−1
i=0 αi·h ·M i·h).
The fact that no S-box is active follows from the definition of S(l).
4.2.1 A Concrete Example: The Starkad Matrix
A concrete example for this case is given by the matrix used for Starkad over F263 with
t = 24, built by using the definition given in Eq. (5) in Section 4.1. Indeed, the minimal
polynomial of this matrix is
φStarkad(x) = x6 + α4 · x4 + α2 · x2 + α0
for particular α4, α2, α0 ∈ F263 . Following Proposition 9, we see that l = 6, h = 2, l′ = 3.
An iterative subspace trail can thus be constructed, as also shown in [KR21].
6In [BCD+20], the authors generalize the result by assuming that {x1, x2, . . . , xt} forms a closed
subgroup of GF (2n). By definition of xi, this is always the case for Starkadπ if t is a power of 2.
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4.2.2 A Generic Example via the Eigenspaces of M l
Finally, we show a concrete example of a matrix that satisfies the previous result. Consider a
matrixM whose minimal polynomial is defined as in Eq. (6), that is, φ(x) =
∑l′
i=0 αi·h ·xi·h,
and assume h ≥ 2. This polynomial is related to φ′(y) =
∑l′
i=0 αi·h · yi by replacing y with
xh. By definition, note that if φ is the minimal polynomial of M , then φ′ is a multiple of
the minimal polynomial of Mh. Moreover, remember that every solution ŷ of φ′ (namely,
such that φ′(ŷ) = 0) is an eigenvalue of M l and that each solution x̂ of φ is an eigenvalue
of M . Since the finite field F is not algebraically closed, given a zero ŷ of φ′ as before, it is
possible that there is no x̂ that satisfies (x̂)h = ŷ, which is related to the existence of an
eigenspace of the matrix M l that is not an eigenspace of M . In more details, if E is an
eigenspace of M with eigenvalue λ, then E is also an eigenspace of M l with eigenvalue λl,
i.e., M · E = λ · E implies M l · E = λl · E . Working over a space which is not algebraically
closed, the other direction is not true in general. Here we exploit these facts in order to
present a more generic example of an iterative subspace trail.
Lemma 3. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes defined as in Eq. (1), let
M ∈ Ft×t be the invertible matrix that defines the linear layer. Let λ(l)1 , . . . , λ
(l)
τ ∈ Ft be
the eigenvalues of M l for some l ≥ 1, and let P(l)1 , . . . ,P
(l)
τ ⊆ Ft be their corresponding




2 , . . . ,S(l)∩
P(l)τ
〉
generates an infinitely long iterative subspace trail of period l with no active S-box.
Proof. The proof of this result is analogous to the one proposed for Proposition 8. In
particular, it is sufficient to note that no S-box is active due to the definition of S(l) (see
Eq. (3)), and that the subspace trail is iterative with a period equal to l since I(l) is
constructed via the eigenspaces of M l.
We point out that this result includes the case in which the matrix has a low multi-
plicative order, or more formally, the condition stated in Lemma 3 implies the condition
stated in Proposition 8. Indeed, let l ≥ 2 be the smallest integer such that M l = µ · I.
Then e1, . . . , et are all eigenvectors of M l with eigenvalue µ. Given S(l) constructed as
in Eq. (3) such that no S-box is active in the first l rounds, then S(l) is an invariant
subspace of M l, since 〈e1, . . . , et〉 is an eigenspace of M l corresponding to the eigenvalue
µ. It follows that
(
S(l),M · S(l),M2 · S(l), . . . ,M l−1 · S(l)
)
is an infinitely long iterative
(constant-dimensional) subspace trail.
We remark that the two conditions are not equivalent (that is, the condition stated in
Proposition 8 does in general not imply the condition stated in Lemma 3), as shown in
the following concrete example.
Example. Consider the circulant matrix M = circ(a, b, c, d) over F4. Its eigenvalues and
eigenvectors are equal to
λ0 = a+ b+ c+ d : (1, 1, 1, 1)T ,




a2 + b2 − 2ac+ c2 − 2bd+ d2 : (b− d,−a+ c+ λ1, d− b, a− c− λ1)T ,
λ3 =
√
a2 + b2 − 2ac+ c2 − 2bd+ d2 : (b− d,−a+ c+ λ2, d− b, a− c− λ2)T ,
330 Proving Resistance Against Infinitely Long Subspace Trails
if a2 + b2 − 2ac+ c2 − 2bd+ d2 is a quadratic residue modulo p,7 while the eigenvalues
and eigenvectors of M2 are given by
Λ0 = (λ0)2 = a2 + 2a(b+ c+ d) + b2 + 2b(c+ d) + c2 + 2cd+ d2 : (1, 1, 1, 1)T ,
Λ1 = (λ3)2 = a2 − 2a(b− c+ d) + b2 − 2b(c− d) + c2 − 2cd+ d2 : (1,−1, 1,−1)T ,
Λ2 = (λ1)2 = a2 + b2 − 2ac+ c2 − 2bd+ d2 : (1, 0,−1, 0)T ,
Λ3 = (λ2)2 = a2 + b2 − 2ac+ c2 − 2bd+ d2 : (0, 1, 0,−1)T .
Since x 7→ x2 is not a permutation over Fp for any prime p ≥ 3 (see Hermite’s criterion), it is
possible that there exist a, b, c, d, such that a2 +b2−2ac+c2−2bd+d2 = (a−c)2 +(b−d)2
is a quadratic non-residue. As a concrete example, by taking a − c = b − d, then
(a− c)2 + (b− d)2 = 2 · (a− c)2 is not a quadratic residue modulo p if Lp(2) = −1 (where
Lp : Fp → {−1, 0, 1} is the Legendre symbol), which happens if p = 3, 5 mod 8 (we refer
to [Nag51] for more details). Hence, while M2 has always four eigenvalues, it is possible
that M has only two eigenvalues for certain values of a, b, c, d ∈ Fp.8
This fact can be exploited in order to construct a matrix M that is not a multiple of
the identity and for which an infinitely long iterative subspace trail exists. Given a P-SPN
scheme over (Fp)5 with s = 1, an example of such a matrix is
M =

x y w y w
z0 a b c d
z1 b c d a
z2 c d a b
z3 d a b c

for particular values of a, b, c, d, x, y, w, zj ∈ Fp such that (1) the matrix is invertible
and it provides full diffusion (at word level after a finite number of rounds) for cryp-
tographic purposes and (2) the circulant matrix circ(a, b, c, d) has only two eigenvalues.
The iterative (non-invariant) subspace trail is thus given by
{
I = 〈(0, 0, 1, 0,−1)T 〉,
M · I = 〈(0, b− d, c− a, d− b, a− c)T 〉
}
, where M2 · I = I and where M2 6= µ · I for each
µ ∈ Fp. Finally, note that M2 is not necessarily equal to a multiple of the identity. For




1,5 = xy0 + y0a+ y1b+ y0c+ y1d is different
from 0 by appropriately choosing the entries.
5 Practical Tests (Without Active S-Boxes)
In this section, we first present an algorithm which can be used to find vulnerabilities and
to detect weak matrices (with respect to the attacks presented before). Moreover, we test
several matrices over Fp and over F2n to give an idea of the number of these matrices.
5.1 Algorithm for Detecting Weak Matrices
In order to find the vulnerabilities, we use the results given in Theorem 3 and Proposition 4.
In more detail, we first decompose the full space into (potentially smaller) M -invariant
subspaces, that is, Ft =
⊕m
i=1Ai, where this decomposition results from Theorem 1. For
this purpose, we need the minimal polynomial of the matrix obtained by the Frobenius
normal form. We then take the intersection of these subspaces with the unit vectors
at the identity positions of the nonlinear layer, i.e., X (0)i = Ai ∩ 〈es+1, . . . , et〉. Now we
apply Proposition 4 to each of these subspaces X (0)i , which means reducing the dimensions
7By definition, x ∈ Fp is a quadratic residue modulo p if y ∈ Fp such that x = y2, while it is a quadratic
non-residue otherwise.
8E.g., given (a, b, c, d) = (1, 1, 2, 3), a2 + b2 − 2ac+ c2 − 2bd+ d2 is a square in F11, but not in F13.
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Algorithm 1: Determining the existence of invariant infinitely long subspace
trails without active S-boxes, using Theorem 3 and Proposition 4.
Data: P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes applied to the first s words.
Result: 1 if an invariant infinitely long subspace trail without active S-boxes
exists, 0 otherwise.
1 Obtain A1,A2, . . . ,Am using Theorem 1.
2 for i← 1 to m do
3 Ai ← Ai ∩ 〈es+1, . . . , et〉.
4 while dim(Ai) > 0 do
5 if Ai = M · Ai then
6 break
7 Ai ← (M · Ai ∩ Ai).
8 I ← 〈A1,A2, . . . ,Am〉.
9 if dim(I) > 0 then
10 return 1: Discard the matrix M (due to existence of an invariant subspace
trail generated by I – Theorem 3).
11 return 0: No infinitely long subspace trail without active S-boxes found.
of these subspaces until the dimension becomes either zero or until the subspace has a
nonzero dimension and does not change when applying the matrix multiplication. These
final subspaces are Pi for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. We now build the space
I = 〈P1,P2, . . . ,Pm〉
and report that the matrix is vulnerable with respect to infinitely long invariant subspace
trails if and only if dim(I) > 0. The detailed steps are shown as a pseudo code in
Algorithm 1. We emphasize that, while Algorithm 1 only detects infinitely long invariant
subspace trails, this is sufficient in order to also prevent infinitely long iterative subspace
trails. We refer to Proposition 7 for more details.
Computational Cost of Algorithm 1. The complexity of computing the Frobenius normal
form is an element of O(t3) for a t× t matrix [Sto98]. Moreover, since m ≤ t and since
the dimension of each Ai can be reduced at most t times, the complexity of the loop is an
element of O(t2). Hence, the computational cost is an element of O(t3 + t2) = O(t3).
Computational Cost in Practice. In our practical runtime tests, we focus on prime fields
Fp for p ≥ 3 and we use Sage. To give some concrete numbers, for dlog2(p)e = 16, the test
for a single matrix takes about 4 milliseconds for t = 4, while it takes about 30 milliseconds
for t = 16 (using an Intel Xeon E5-2699v4 with a maximum clock frequency of 3.60 GHz).
5.2 Percentage of Weak Linear Layers
We implemented Algorithm 1 in Sage and used it to get an idea of the percentage of
matrices that are vulnerable to the attack without active S-boxes presented in Section 3.
Different Classes of Matrices. For concrete use cases, we set s = 1 and we focus on
two scenarios, namely random invertible matrices and random Cauchy matrices.9 As
the source for randomness we use Sage’s random engine in both cases (and for choosing




for each i 6= j : xi 6= xj , yi 6= yj , xi + yj 6= 0. Cauchy matrices are MDS matrices.
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Table 1: Percentage of vulnerable matrices for Algorithm 1 and orders t, when considering
prime fields Fp.
dlog2(p)e 8 4 6 16 8 12 16 8
t 3 4 4 4 8 8 8 12
Vulnerable (%)
(Random Invertible) 0.46 8.94 2.06 < 0.01 0.51 0.03 < 0.01 0.50
Vulnerable (%)
(MDS, Random Cauchy) 0.49 6.12 2.03 < 0.01 0.49 0.03 < 0.01 0.52
Table 2: Percentage of vulnerable matrices for Algorithm 1 and orders t, when considering
binary fields F2n .
n 8 4 6 16 8 12 16 8
t 3 4 4 4 8 8 8 12
Vulnerable (%)
(Random Invertible) 0.37 6.26 1.50 < 0.01 0.40 0.03 < 0.01 0.41
Vulnerable (%)
(MDS, Random Cauchy) 0.39 5.14 1.48 < 0.01 0.41 0.02 < 0.01 0.37
e.g. the prime numbers). In the first scenario, we create a matrix space, sample random
matrices, and finally determine if they are invertible. In the second scenario, we generate
Cauchy matrices using random (and valid) starting sequences. We tested all matrices using
both prime fields and binary fields, focusing on square matrices of order t ∈ {3, 4, 8, 12}
and on F2n and Fp with n ∈ {4, 6, 8, 12, 16} and dlog2(p)e ∈ {4, 6, 8, 12, 16}, respectively.
Moreover, we tested our algorithm on the concrete matrices used to instantiate Starkad
and Poseidon. We present these results in Appendix C.1.
Concrete Results. The sample size for all tests was set to 100 000 and the results are
given in Table 1 and Table 2. We used different values for p for each specified range. We
can immediately see that the size of p (or n) has a significant impact on the number of
vulnerable matrices. Specifically, increasing p (or n) tends to result in a higher probability
for a matrix to be secure against the attacks presented here. We can observe that this is
also true when keeping N = n · t constant. For example, (n, t) = (16, 4) results in a very
different probability compared to (n, t) = (8, 8) (similar for (n, t) = (8, 3) and (n, t) = (6, 4),
or for (n, t) = (12, 8) and (n, t) = (8, 12)). However, even for small fields, a secure matrix
can easily be found by just testing a small number of matrices with our tool.
6 Infinitely Long Subspace Trails for P-SPN Schemes (Ac-
tive S-Boxes)
Until now, we focused on the case in which no S-box is active. Here, we analyze the
scenario in which S-boxes are active.
Assumption on the S-Box. From now on, we only work with S-boxes that do not have
any nontrivial linear structures. That is, for an S-box S over F, we assume that it is not
possible to find nontrivial subspaces U ,V ⊂ F (that is, U ,V 6= {0},F) such that for each
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u ∈ F there exists v ∈ F such that S(U + u) = V + v. If the S-box has no nontrivial linear
structures, there are only two essential subspace trails ({0} → {0} and F → F) when
working at word level, as was shown in [LTW18]. Under this assumption, one can work
independently of the details of the S-box. For example, both the AES S-box and the cube
one (x 7→ x3) satisfy this assumption.
This choice is made both in order to simplify the presentation and since many of the
S-boxes used in the literature satisfy this assumption. Note that given an infinitely long
subspace trail with probability 1, the following facts hold.
• If the S-box does not have any nontrivial linear structure, then each S-box can either
be fully active or fully passive (equivalently, each input of the S-boxes either takes
all possible values or is constant).
• If the S-box has a nontrivial linear structure, then it is possible that the input of the
S-boxes can take values only in a specific nontrivial affine subspace.
It follows that the infinitely long subspace trails analyzed in the following can be constructed
for all possible S-boxes. However, if the S-box has a nontrivial linear structure, then other
infinitely long subspace trails may exist as well.
6.1 Preliminary Results: Subspace Trails & Truncated Differentials
We first present a generic result regarding the minimum number of rounds for which it is
possible to set up a subspace trail with a probability of 1.















= 0). Let R <∞ be a finite number. There exists a subspace trail with











where S(i) is defined as in Eq. (3) and where A(i) :=
〈
M(e1), . . . ,M(es),M · A(i−1)
〉
for
i ≥ 1 (where A(0) := MR−1 · S(R)).
As for Lemma 2, this well-known result (whose proof can be found in Appendix A)
only depends on the number of S-boxes, and no assumption on the matrix M is made.
Like in the case presented in Section 3.1, note that depending on the details of the linear
layer, a longer subspace trail of dimension 1 can be set up.
6.2 Infinitely Long Invariant Subspace Trails with Active S-Boxes via
the Eigenspaces of M
Using the approach from Section 3.2, here we present some simple examples of infinitely
long invariant subspace trails with active S-boxes based on the eigenspaces of the matrix
M . For this purpose, let us first introduce the concept of “compatible” subspaces.
Definition 13. Let s ∈ {1, . . . , t − 1} be an integer. Let V ⊆ Ft be a subspace and let
I ⊆ {1, . . . , s}. We say that the subspace V is I-compatible if and only if
• if I = ∅, then V ⊆ 〈es+1, . . . , et〉,
• if I = {ι1, ι2, . . . , ι|I|}, then
1. V ⊆ 〈eι1 , . . . , eι|I| , es+1, . . . , et〉,
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2. 〈eι1 , . . . , eι|I|〉 ⊆ V.
If there exists I ⊆ {1, . . . , s} such that V is I-compatible, then I is unique, in the sense
that V cannot be J-compatible for any J 6= I. At the same time, note that it is possible
that there is no I such that V is I-compatible. For example, working over (Fp)t for a prime
p ≥ 3 and t ≥ 3, consider the subspace V = 〈e1 + 2 · e2〉. If s = 1, we can immediately see
that there is no I such that the subspace V is I-compatible.
Proposition 11. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes defined as in Eq. (1),
let M ∈ Ft×t be the invertible matrix defining the linear layer. Let λ1, . . . , λτ ∈ F be the
eigenvalues of M , and let P1, . . . ,Pτ ⊆ F t be the corresponding eigenspaces (where τ ≤ t).
Let I = {ι1, . . . , ι|I|} ⊆ {1, . . . , s} be the indices of the active S-boxes (where I 6= ∅), and
I =
〈
P ′1, . . . ,P ′τ
〉
,
where P ′h is a subspace10 of Ph for h ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. If 1 ≤ dim(I) < t and if I is I-
compatible, then I generates an infinitely long invariant subspace trail with active S-boxes.
Proof. Since I is I-compatible, the first condition in Definition 13 ensures that the l-th
S-box is not active if l /∈ I. For each i-th active S-box, where i ∈ I, the second condition
in Definition 13 implies that the entire space 〈ei〉 is included in I. The consequence is
that, when applying the S-box, the subspace remains the same.
As for the results given in the previous sections, this subspace remains invariant through
the linear layer since it is defined via the eigenspaces of M . Hence, I results in an infinitely
long invariant subspace trail.
Note that the number of active S-boxes in the previous subspace trail is proportional to
the number of rounds (so, potentially “infinite”). As before, we emphasize that, in general,
the previous observation provides only a sufficient condition.
Example. Let ω ∈ {0, 1}. Given a P-SPN scheme with s = 1, consider the following 4× 4
matrix M defined over a field Fp for p ≥ 3:
M =
ω ((1 − ω) − M1,3 · b − M1,4 · c)/a M1,3 M1,4a (−a · ω − M2,3 · b − M2,4 · c)/a M2,3 M2,4b (−b · ω − M3,3 · b − M3,4 · c)/a M3,3 M3,4
c (−c · ω − M4,3 · b − M4,4 · c)/a M4,3 M4,4
 , (7)
where a 6= 0. A proper choice of a, b, c and M·,· provides invertibility and “full diffusion”
(at word level after a finite number of rounds) for cryptographic purposes. The subspace
I =
〈
e1 = (1, 0, 0, 0)T , v = (ω, a, b, c)T
〉
,
where M · e1 = v and M · v = e1, is invariant under the round transformation for any
number of rounds. Indeed, since the first word can take every value and because the S-box
is applied only to this word, I remains invariant (note that the S-box is active). Hence,
this is a concrete example of an infinitely long invariant subspace trail with active S-boxes,
where P1 = 〈v + e1〉 and P2 = 〈v − e1〉 are the eigenspaces of the matrix M that satisfy
the conditions given in the previous theorem.
Lastly, we remark that matrices of the form Eq. (7) are currently used in the literature.
For example, the circulant almost-MDS matrix over F2n defined as circ(0,1,1,1) is used in
Midori [BBI+15] and QARMA[Ava17].
10We start with eigenspaces since any such constructed input space is invariant when ignoring the S-boxes.
By imposing additional conditions for the active S-boxes we finally arrive at subspaces of eigenspaces.
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6.3 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for the Existence of Infinitely
Long Invariant Subspace Trails with Active S-boxes
As done before, the natural step is to replace the eigenspaces of M with subspaces that
are M -invariant. As a main result, in this section we present a necessary and sufficient
condition that allows to discard “weak” matrices with respect to invariant subspaces with
and without active S-boxes.
Theorem 4. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes defined as in Eq. (1), let
M ∈ Ft×t be the invertible matrix that defines the linear layer. Assume that the S-box has
no (nontrivial) linear structure. Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , s} be the positions of the active S-boxes
(note that I = ∅ is also possible, that is, we do not require |I| ≥ 1). A subspace I with
1 ≤ dim(I) < t generates an infinitely long invariant subspace trail (with active S-boxes if
|I| ≥ 1) if and only if I is both M -invariant and I-compatible.
Proof. The case I = ∅ corresponds to the case analyzed in Theorem 2. Hence, here we
assume |I| ≥ 1 (where I = {i1, i2, . . . , i|I|}).
Our approach is based on the strategy proposed for Theorem 3 and Proposition 11.
We first show that an M -invariant and I-compatible subspace generates an infinitely long
invariant subspace trail with active S-boxes. The proof is almost equal to the one given
for Proposition 11. The only difference is that the condition that I is related to the
eigenspaces of M is replaced by the more generic assumption that I is an M -invariant
subspace. At the same time, since I is I-compatible (i.e., 〈ei1 , ei2 , . . . , ei|I|〉 ⊆ I and
I ⊆ 〈ei1 , ei2 , . . . , ei|I| , es+1, . . . , et〉), every i-th S-box is active if and only if i ∈ I, and
inactive otherwise. We recall that for an active S-box the input difference can take each
possible value in F, and for an inactive S-box the input difference is equal to zero.
Vice-versa, assume that a subspace I generates an infinitely long invariant subspace
trail with active S-boxes. First of all, this can happen if and only if it satisfies the condition
I = M · I. Indeed, by contradiction, if there exists x ∈ I such that M · x /∈ I, then I
would not be M -invariant. Moreover, since the subspace trail is M -invariant and with
active S-boxes, each S-box can only be either constant or active. In particular, only two
scenarios are possible. Either the input difference (and the output difference) of the S-box
is equal to zero11 or the input (and the output) of the S-box is active. Since the S-box
does not have any linear structure, other cases are not compatible with the hypothesis of
an invariant subspace trail with active S-boxes. Hence, there must exist I ⊆ {1, . . . , s}
such that I is I-compatible.
As expected, the result presented in Proposition 11 satisfies the previous theorem. This
is due to the fact that the subspace I defined in Proposition 11 is related to the eigenspaces
of M , which satisfy the condition I = M · I. We formulate the following corollary.
Corollary 2. The infinitely long subspace trail with active S-boxes presented in Proposi-
tion 11 satisfies Theorem 4.
A generalization of Proposition 11 (by replacing the eigenspaces with the generic
invariant subspaces of M) is given in the following Theorem.
Theorem 5. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes defined as in Eq. (1), let
M ∈ Ft×t be the invertible matrix that defines the linear layer. Assume that the S-box has
no (nontrivial) linear structure. Let {A1,A2, . . . ,Am} be the primary decomposition of Ft
with respect to the matrix M , as defined in Theorem 1.
A subspace I, where 1 ≤ dim(I) < t, generates an infinitely long invariant subspace
trail with active S-boxes only in positions I = {i1, . . . , i|I|} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , s} (that is, where
11Equivalently, the input and the output of the S-box are constant.
336 Proving Resistance Against Infinitely Long Subspace Trails
the i-th S-box is active if and only if i ∈ I) if and only if
I = 〈P1,P2, . . . ,Pm〉,
where
1. for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}: Pi ⊆
(




2. I is I-compatible.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is a consequence of the result given in Theorem 4 and in
Theorem 1. In particular, due to the argument given in Theorem 4, we immediately see
that I = 〈P1,P2, . . . ,Pm〉, where I is both M -invariant and I-compatible, generates an
infinitely long invariant subspace trail with active S-boxes.
Vice-versa, if a subspace generates an infinitely long invariant subspace trail with active
S-boxes, then it must be M -invariant and I-compatible, due to Theorem 4 and due to the
fact that the S-box has no nontrivial linear structure. The particular shape of I is due to
Theorem 1. Following the proof of Theorem 3, let
Pi := Ai ∩ I.
All Pi are M -invariant subspaces. In particular, we have that I = 〈P1,P2, . . . ,Pm〉 since
all Ai are independent (in the sense that Ai ∩ Aj = {0}) and since Ft =
⊕
iAi.
We emphasize that in general it is not trivial to give a precise “description/shape” of
the subspaces Pi. This is due to the fact that we have two conditions, first all Pi have
to be M -invariant and secondly the full subspace I must be I-compatible. For example,
there may be two subspaces Ai,Aj such that they are both M -invariant and such that
• neither Ai nor Aj are I-compatible, but
• 〈Ai,Aj〉 is I-compatible.
In such a case, the span 〈Ai,Aj〉 can generate an infinitely long invariant subspace with
active S-boxes, but not the two subspaces Ai,Aj . As a concrete example working over Ftp
for a prime p 1 and t ≥ 3, consider the subspace V = 〈e1 + 2 · e2〉 and W = 〈e1 − e2〉,
and assume that they are both M -invariant for a particular matrix M . If s = 1, it is not
hard to see that neither V nor W are I-compatible, while 〈V,W〉 = 〈e1, e2〉 is obviously
{1}-compatible. Hence, while in the case without active S-boxes we can work independently
on the subspaces Ai (obtained as the decomposition of the Ft), here it is not possible.
A special (trivial) case of the previous theorem is given in the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes defined as in Eq. (1), let
M ∈ Ft×t be the invertible matrix that defines the linear layer. Let {A1,A2, . . . ,Am} be
the primary decomposition of Ft with respect to the matrix M . If there exists I ⊆ {1, . . . , s}
and a subspace Ai such that Ai is I-compatible, then Ai generates an infinitely long
invariant subspace trail with active S-boxes.
An Example for Showing the Difference Between Inactive and Active S-Boxes. Finally,
one may ask if there exist P-SPN schemes which are vulnerable to subspace trails with
active S-boxes, but not to trails without active S-boxes. Assuming a P-SPN scheme with
s = 1, an example for a matrix fulfilling these properties is given by the 4× 4 MDS matrix
M =

3 1 1 2
3 4 2 1
2 1 3 4
4 1 4 1

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over Fp for p ≥ 101. In such a case, I =
〈
(1, 0, 0, 0)T , (0, 1, 0, 2)T , (0, 0, 1, p− 1)T
〉
generates an infinitely long invariant subspace trail with active S-boxes. Using our
proposed tool, it is possible to see that no infinitely long invariant or iterative subspace
trail without active S-boxes exists.
6.4 Infinitely Long Iterative Subspace Trails with Active S-Boxes
Here we generalize the previous results in order to cover the case of iterative subspace
trails with active S-boxes.
Theorem 6. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes defined as in Eq. (1), let
M ∈ Ft×t be the invertible matrix that defines the linear layer. Assume that the S-box has
no (nontrivial) linear structure. Let l ≥ 1 be the period of the iterative subspace trail. For
each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, let Ij ⊆ {1, . . . , s} be the positions of the active S-boxes (note that
Ij = ∅ is also possible, that is, we do not require |Ij | ≥ 1) at the (r + 1)-th round for r = j
mod l. A subspace I of dimension 1 ≤ dim(I) < t generates an infinitely long iterative
subspace trail (with active S-boxes if at least one Ij satisfies |Ij | ≥ 1) of period l if and
only if
(1) M j · I is Ij-compatible for j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , l − 1};
(2) I is M l-invariant.
Proof. This result is a generalization of Theorem 4. In particular, I forms an l-round
invariant subspace trail, i.e., a trail that is equal every l rounds. Hence, all l-round iterative
subspace trails are of the form {I,M · I,M2 · I, . . . ,M l−1 · I}. Since we assume that the
S-box has no (nontrivial) linear structure, such a trail has active S-boxes if and only if the
first condition (namely, for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l} there exists Ij such that M j−1 · I is Ij
compatible) is satisfied.
We highlight that the active S-boxes are not forced to be in an active position (it is
also possible that no S-box is active in some rounds). Moreover, the following result holds.
Theorem 7. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes defined as in Eq. (1), let
M ∈ Ft×t be the invertible matrix that defines the linear layer. Assume that the S-box has
no (nontrivial) linear structure. Let l ≥ 2, and let {A(l)1 ,A
(l)
2 , . . . ,A
(l)
m } be the primary
decomposition of Ft with respect to the matrix M l, as defined in Theorem 1.
A subspace I, where 1 ≤ dim(I) < t, generates an infinitely long iterative subspace
trail of period l ≥ 2 with active S-boxes only in positions Ij = {i1,j , . . . , i|Ij |,j} ⊆ {1, . . . , s}
in the j-th round (where j is taken modulo l) if and only if
I = 〈P1,P2, . . . ,Pm〉,
where
1. for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}: Pi ⊆
(
A(l)i ∩ 〈ei1,0, ei2,0, . . . , ei|I0|,0 , es+1, . . . , et〉
)
is an
M l-invariant subspace, and
2. for each j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , l − 1}: (M j · I) is Ij-compatible.
The proof is a simple generalization of the one given for Theorem 5 based on Theorem 6.
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Examples. Given a P-SPN scheme with s = 1, consider again the 4× 4 matrix M defined
in Eq. (7). The subspace I =
〈
e1 = (1, 0, 0, 0)T
〉
generates an infinitely long iterative
subspace trail with active S-boxes (of period 2) of the form{
I =
〈
e1 = (1, 0, 0, 0)T
〉
,M · I =
〈
(0, a, b, c)T
〉}
,
where I2i = {1} and I1+2i = ∅ for each i ≥ 0.
For a second example, consider the case of a P-SPN scheme over (F2n)4 with s = 1 and
M = circ(0, 1, 1, 1). Clearly, both
〈




(0, 1, 0, 1)T
〉
are invariant subspace
trails without active S-boxes. As shown before,
〈
(1, 0, 0, 0)T , (0, 1, 1, 1)T
〉
is an invariant
subspace trail with active S-boxes, while
〈
(1, 0, 0, 0)T
〉
is an iterative (non-invariant)
subspace trail with active S-boxes. By combining them, it is possible to set up new iterative
subspace trails with active S-boxes, e.g., I =
〈
(1, 0, 0, 0)T , (0, 1, 1, 0)T , (0, 1, 0, 1)T
〉
.
About Iterative Subspace Trails with Active S-Boxes
Due to the results presented in Proposition 7, one may ask if there exist nontrivial iterative
subspace trails with active S-boxes, namely P-SPN schemes for which there exist iterative
subspace trails with active S-boxes but no subspace trails without active S-boxes or
invariant subspace trails with active S-boxes. For this purpose, consider a P-SPN scheme
over F3p (for s = 1 and t = 3), where the linear layer is defined by the matrix
M =
0 1 −11 −2 1
1 −4 2
 . (8)
The (nontrivial) subspace trail(
V0 = 〈(1, 0, 0)T 〉,V1 = M · V0 = 〈(0, 1, 1)T 〉,V2 = M2 · V0 = 〈(0, 1, 2)T 〉
)
is iterative (since V0 is a proper subspace of F3p and V0 = M3 · V0) with active S-boxes.
Since dim(〈V0,V1,V2〉) = 3, it is not possible to set up an invariant subspace trail via the
previous iterative subspace trail. Moreover, using the results and the tools presented in
the paper, it is possible to show that (e.g., for p = 251) no invariant subspace trail (either
with or without active S-boxes) can cover an infinite number of rounds.
7 Practical Tests (Active S-Boxes)
The results given in Theorem 5 to Theorem 7 seem hard to exploit in practice. A direct
construction of the infinitely long subspace trail with active S-boxes is indeed missing.
Without that, the cost of evaluating all subspaces I would likely be too large, since one
has to compute all possible subspaces of A1,A2, . . . ,Am. Here, we fix this problem by
proposing two algorithms, namely one for the case of infinitely long invariant subspace
trails and one for the case of iterative trails (both with active S-boxes). Further, we test
several matrices over Fp and over F2n to get an idea of the number of “weak” matrices.
Before going on, we emphasize again that we work under the assumption that the
S-box has no linear structure. This assumption is crucial in order to have only two cases,
namely the case in which the input of the S-box is constant and the case in which the
input of the S-box is active (namely, the input can take any possible value). Since the
S-box is a permutation, these two cases remain unchanged through the S-box. In other
words, if the input is neither constant nor active, all information is lost when applying the
S-box. This is not the case if the S-box has a linear structure.
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Algorithm 2: Determining the existence of infinitely long invariant subspace
trails with active S-boxes.
Data: P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes applied to the first s words (where
the S-box has no linear structure).
Result: 1 if an (invariant) infinitely long invariant subspace trail with active
S-boxes is found, 0 otherwise.
1 foreach Is ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , s} such that |Is| ≥ 1 (where Is := {ι1, . . . , ι|Is|}) do
2 I ← 〈eι1 , . . . , eι|Is|〉.
3 foreach i ∈ Is do
4 v ← ei.
5 do
6 δ ← dim(I).
7 v ←M · v.
8 I ← 〈I, v〉.
9 if dim(I) = t or I ∩ 〈eι1 , . . . , eι|Is| , es+1, . . . , et〉 6= I then
10 break (move to next Is)
11 while dim(I) > δ
12 return 1: infinitely long invariant subspace trail with active S-boxes found: I
with active S-boxes in Is.
13 return 0: No infinitely long invariant subspace trail with active S-boxes found.
7.1 Related Strategies in the Literature
In order to find invariant or iterative subspaces with active S-boxes, we decided to adapt
algorithms already existing in the literature for our goal, that is the one proposed in
[LMR15] for the detection of invariant subspace trails and the one proposed in [GLR+20a]
for the detection of weak-key subspace trails.
Let us focus on the algorithm proposed in [LMR15]. Given an SPN-like permutation,
the goal is to find a subspace U and an offset u that is invariant under the keyless round
function R(·), namely R(U + u) = U + v for a certain v. In the case of an SPN scheme, it
is sufficient to choose the round key k ∈ Kweak = U + (u− v) if one aims to keep the coset
invariant (depending on the key schedule, such a subspace trail can cover either a finite or
an infinite number of rounds).
The approach described in [LMR15, Lemma 1] serves as the basis for our algorithms.
After first guessing one possible offset u of the subspace to be found and fixing v = R(u),
the idea is then to guess a one-dimensional subspace A0 and to increase the space by
computing
Ai+1 = 〈R(Ai + u)− v,Ai〉.
If Ai+1 = Ai for some i > 0, the attacker has found an invariant subspace. If this is not
the case, they keep increasing the dimension of the subspace until full dimension is reached.
7.2 Algorithms for Detecting “Weak” Matrices
7.2.1 Infinitely Long Invariant Subspace Trails with Active S-Boxes
Our main algorithm is based on the idea proposed in [LMR15] and briefly recalled in
Section 7.1. In particular, the procedure is as follows.
1. We choose an initial subspace I generated by the unit vectors at the active S-box
positions defined in Is = {ι1, . . . , ι|Is|}.
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Table 3: Percentage of vulnerable matrices using Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2, Algorithm 3
over prime fields Ftp. We denote by “Sx” and “Vx” the security and vulnerability w.r.t.
Algorithm x, respectively (e.g., S1 denotes security w.r.t. Algorithm 1, while V2 denotes
vulnerability w.r.t. Algorithm 2). For Algorithm 3, we use a maximum period of l = 2t.
dlog2(p)e 8 4 6 16 8 12 16 8
t 3 4 4 4 8 8 8 12
Random Invertible
% (V2) 0.48 8.94 2.02 < 0.01 0.47 0.03 < 0.01 0.51
% (V2 ∧ S1) 0.48 7.46 1.94 < 0.01 0.46 0.03 < 0.01 0.51
% (V2 ∨ V1) 0.94 16.41 4.00 < 0.01 0.97 0.06 < 0.01 1.01
% (V3 ∧ S2) < 0.01 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
% (V3 ∧ S1 ∧ S2) < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
% (V3 ∨ V2 ∨ V1) 0.94 16.41 4.00 < 0.01 0.97 0.06 < 0.01 1.01
MDS, Random Cauchy
% (V2) 0.51 6.12 1.84 < 0.01 0.53 0.04 < 0.01 0.48
% (V2 ∧ S1) 0.50 5.29 1.76 < 0.01 0.52 0.04 < 0.01 0.47
% (V2 ∨ V1) 0.99 11.41 3.79 < 0.01 1.01 0.07 < 0.01 0.99
% (V3 ∧ S2) < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
% (V3 ∧ S1 ∧ S2) < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
% (V3 ∨ V2 ∨ V1) 0.99 11.41 3.79 < 0.01 1.01 0.07 < 0.01 0.99
2. Now, as in the approach described in [LMR15], we keep increasing the dimension of
the subspace until it stabilizes. For this purpose, we keep including M j · ei to the
space for the active S-box positions for j ≥ 1. Indeed, note that if we require that
I = M · I and if x ∈ I, it follows that M j · x ∈ I.
3. If for every active S-box position i there exists a ji ≥ 1 s.t. M ji+h · ei ∈ I for h ≥ 1,
I =
〈




generates an infinitely long invariant subspace trail for the S-box positions in Is,
where j = max(ji). However, if this condition is not fulfilled for some i, then
dim(〈I,M · ei, . . . ,M ji · ei,M ji+1 · ei〉) = 1 + dim(〈I,M · ei, . . . ,M ji · ei〉),
and hence the dimension of I increased by 1. If the condition is never fulfilled, the
largest possible dimension t will be reached after a finite number of iterations. In this
case, it follows that no infinitely long invariant subspace trail with active S-boxes
exists (apart from the trivial one) for the particular set of active S-box positions Is
chosen in the first step.
A pseudo code for this procedure is given in Algorithm 2. Note that in the first step,
an input space has to be chosen based on some particular unit vectors. In the original
approach [LMR15], this quickly becomes too expensive due to the large number of unit
vectors in the nonlinear parts of the designs being considered. However, in our setting we
focus on word-based designs, and further the number of S-boxes s is often small (e.g., s = 1
for HadesMiMC/Poseidon). Hence, we are able to determine if an invariant subspace
trail with active S-boxes exists by evaluating all possibilities in a reasonable amount of
time – an advantage that is not related to our algorithm, but to the setting we consider.
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Table 4: Percentage of vulnerable matrices using Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2, Algorithm 3
over binary fields Ft2n . We denote by “Sx” and “Vx” the security and vulnerability w.r.t.
Algorithm x, respectively (e.g., S1 denotes security w.r.t. Algorithm 1, while V2 denotes
vulnerability w.r.t. Algorithm 2). For Algorithm 3, we use a maximum period of l = 2t.
n 8 4 6 16 8 12 16 8
t 3 4 4 4 8 8 8 12
Random Invertible
% (V2) 0.38 6.25 1.56 < 0.01 0.42 0.02 < 0.01 0.41
% (V2 ∧ S1) 0.38 5.54 1.51 < 0.01 0.42 0.02 < 0.01 0.40
% (V2 ∨ V1) 0.75 11.80 3.01 < 0.01 0.82 0.04 < 0.01 0.81
% (V3 ∧ S2) < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
% (V3 ∧ S1 ∧ S2) < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
% (V3 ∨ V2 ∨ V1) 0.75 11.80 3.01 < 0.01 0.82 0.04 < 0.01 0.81
MDS, Random Cauchy
% (V2) 0.40 5.13 1.51 < 0.01 0.36 0.03 < 0.01 0.42
% (V2 ∧ S1) 0.39 4.10 1.44 < 0.01 0.36 0.03 < 0.01 0.41
% (V2 ∨ V1) 0.79 9.24 2.92 < 0.01 0.77 0.05 < 0.01 0.79
% (V3 ∧ S2) < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
% (V3 ∧ S1 ∧ S2) < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
% (V3 ∨ V2 ∨ V1) 0.79 9.24 2.92 < 0.01 0.77 0.05 < 0.01 0.79
Computational Cost of Algorithm 2. Here we analyze the computational cost of Algo-
rithm 2 in terms of loop iterations. First, consider the loop starting in the second line, and
note that there are 2s − 1 non-empty subsets of {1, . . . , s}. The second loop is iterated
|Is| times for each of these subsets. For the Do-While loop, there are two possible cases.
Either it finishes if the dimension of the new I is equal to the dimension of the old I,
or the dimension of I increased in the last iteration. Observe that the loop ends when
dim (I) = t, and hence this loop is iterated at most t− 1 times. Consequently, the runtime
of Algorithm 2 is an element in O (2sst). Note that this runtime, even though being
exponential in s, is not a major issue in the schemes we consider, since in these schemes
the number of S-boxes per round (i.e., s) tends to be small.
Computational Cost in Practice. We used the same hardware as for the practical tests
in Section 5.2, i.e., an Intel Xeon E5-2699v4 with a maximum clock frequency of 3.60
GHz, together with Sage. Again, we evaluate the performance of Algorithm 2 when using
matrices over prime fields and for n = 16, t ∈ {4, 12}. For t = 4, Algorithm 2 takes about
3 milliseconds. For t = 12, Algorithm 2 takes about 16 milliseconds.
7.2.2 Infinitely Long Iterative Subspace Trails with Active S-Boxes
A similar algorithm can also be used to search for infinitely long iterative subspace trails
with active S-boxes. Following the observations from Theorem 6, in this case we need to
replace the single set Is by l potentially different sets I1, I2, . . . , Il, where l is the period of
the iterative subspace trail and where each of these sets denotes the positions of active
S-boxes in a specific round. A pseudo code for this approach is given in Algorithm 3 in
Appendix B.
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7.3 Percentage of “Weak” Linear Layers
As in the case of Algorithm 1, we estimate the percentage of “weak” linear layers w.r.t.
Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3. We refer to Section 5.2 for a description about the matrices
we used for our tests. Our sample size is 100 000, we focus on the case s = 1, and we used
different values for p for each specified range. To get a better understanding of the results
provided by our algorithms, we made the following distinctions:
(1) matrices which are vulnerable with respect to Algorithm 2,
(2) matrices which are vulnerable with respect to Algorithm 2 and secure with respect
to Algorithm 1,
(3) matrices which are vulnerable with respect to Algorithm 3 and secure with respect
to Algorithm 2,
(4) matrices which are vulnerable with respect to Algorithm 3 and secure with respect
to Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
Table 3 and Table 4 show the results for matrices over Fp and F2n respectively. We can
immediately observe that the numbers are not very different from the numbers obtained
by testing Algorithm 1. Indeed, a similar amount of matrices seems to be vulnerable
with respect to Algorithm 2. Interestingly, when first excluding matrices detected by
Algorithm 1, the percentage is in most cases slightly lower but the difference is negligible.
This fact suggests that using only one of the two algorithms is not sufficient in order to
find all vulnerabilities.
Moreover, when looking at the numbers obtained by testing Algorithm 3, we can see the
“rarity” of matrices which are vulnerable with respect to Algorithm 3, but not vulnerable
with respect to the other two algorithms (see also Section 6.4). Indeed, for our sample
size, the percentage for these matrices is close to zero.
8 Security Against Infinitely Long Subspace Trails
Until now, we presented necessary and sufficient conditions that a (highly nontrivial) linear
layer must satisfy in order to prevent the existence of infinitely long subspace trails. Here,
we present a sufficient condition on the matrix that defines the linear layer of the P-SPN
scheme that – if satisfied – ensures that no infinitely long (invariant/iterative) subspace
trail (with/without active S-boxes) exists. Finally, we list some open problems that could
be interesting for future research.
8.1 Sufficient Condition for Preventing Infinitely Long Subspace Trails
As a final result, we propose a sufficient condition on the matrixM defining the linear layer
of the P-SPN scheme that – if satisfied – ensures that no infinitely long (invariant/iterative)
subspace trail (with/without active S-boxes) exists. This condition only involves the
details of the minimal polynomial of the matrix, and it is independent of the number of
S-boxes per round. At the same time, we emphasize that it is only a sufficient condition.
Hence, there exist matrices which do not satisfy it but which provide security against the
approaches discussed in this paper.
In order to reach this goal, we first prove the following result:
Proposition 12. Let φ be the minimal polynomial of an invertible matrix M ∈ Ft×t.
Assume that φ is irreducible and let v ∈ Ft \ {0}. For each monic polynomial φ′ ∈ F[x]
such that φ′(M) · v = 0 and deg(φ′) ≤ deg(φ), it follows that φ′ = φ.
Before proving the result, we mention that if φ′ is a multiple of φ, then deg(φ′) > deg(φ)
and φ′(M) · w = 0 for each w ∈ Ft.
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Proof. Let v ∈ Ft \ {0} such that φ′(M) · v = 0 for a certain polynomial φ′ for which
deg(φ′) < deg(φ). In such a case, {v,M · v, . . . ,Mdeg(φ)−1 · v} are not linearly independent.
In particular, the subspace V = 〈v,M · v, . . . ,Mdeg(φ′)−1 · v〉 is a proper M -invariant
subspace of Ft. Due to [Kai08, Prop. 2], we have that φ
∣∣
V= φ
′ divides φ. However, this is
not possible, since φ is irreducible. It follows that each monic polynomial φ′ ∈ F[x] such
that φ′(M) · v = 0 and deg(φ′) ≤ deg(φ) has the same degree as φ.
Next, we have to prove that φ′ = φ. As before, let v ∈ Ft \ {0} such that φ′(M) · v = 0
for a certain monic polynomial φ′ where d = deg(φ′) = deg(φ) and φ′ 6= φ. It follows
that there are two linear combinations of {v,M · v, . . . ,Md · v} that are equal to zero, one
induced by φ′ and one induced by φ (note that they are different since φ′ 6= φ and since the
two polynomials are monic, that is, φ′ is not a multiple of φ). Hence, there exists a linear
combination of {v,M · v, . . . ,Md−1 · v} that is equal to zero.12 Thus, there also exists a
polynomial φ′′ of degree strictly less than d for which φ′′(M) · v = 0. Such a polynomial is
a nontrivial divisor of φ, which leads to a contradiction.
Based on this result, we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 13. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes defined as in Eq. (1), let
M ∈ Ft×t be the invertible matrix that defines the linear layer. Assume that the S-box has
no (nontrivial) linear structure. If the minimal polynomial φ of M has maximum degree t
and is irreducible, there is no infinitely long invariant subspace trail with/without active
S-boxes.
Proof. Due to Proposition 12 and since deg(φ) = t, for each v ∈ Ft \ {0} the vectors
{v,M · v,M2 · v, . . . ,M t−1 · v}
are linearly independent. Hence, there is no nontrivial subspace of Ft that is M -invariant.
Indeed, if S is an M -invariant subspace, then {v,M · v,M2 · v, . . . ,M t−1 · v} must be in S
for each v ∈ S \ {0}. Since {v,M · v,M2 · v, . . . ,M t−1 · v} are linearly independent and
since S is a subspace, it follows that 〈v,M ·v,M2 ·v, . . . ,M t−1 ·v〉 ⊆ S, that is, dim(S) = t,
which implies that S is a trivial subspace. Hence, there is no nontrivial subspace S in Ft
that generates an infinitely long invariant subspace trail both in the case with and without
active S-boxes (under the assumption that the S-box has no nontrivial linear structure).
Note that this result does not imply security against infinitely long iterative subspace
trails with active S-boxes. Indeed, as shown in the example given in Eq. (8), there are
matrices for which there exists an infinitely long iterative subspace trail with active S-boxes
but no infinitely long invariant subspace trails. In order to guarantee security against
all infinitely long subspace trails (under the assumption that the S-box has no nontrivial
linear structure), we propose the following result.
Theorem 8. Let l ≥ 1. Given a P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes defined as in
Eq. (1), let M ∈ Ft×t be the invertible matrix that defines the linear layer. Assume that the
S-box has no (nontrivial) linear structure. If all the minimal polynomials of M,M2, . . . ,M l
are of maximum degree t and irreducible, then there is no infinitely long subspace trail
with/without active S-boxes of period less than or equal to l.
The proof is a simple generalization of the previous results, by keeping in mind that an




i · v) = 0 and
∑d
i=0 βi(M
i · v) = 0, then
∑d−1
i=0 (αiβd − βiαd)(M
i · v) = 0.
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Table 5: Percentages of Cauchy MDS matrices fulfilling the requirement in Proposition 13.
Cauchy MDS matrices over Fp
dlog2(p)e 8 4 6 16 8 12 16 8
t 3 4 4 4 8 8 8 12
Secure (%) ≥ 33.79 ≥ 26.52 ≥ 24.66 ≥ 25.23 ≥ 13.42 ≥ 12.89 ≥ 12.42 ≥ 8.10
Cauchy MDS matrices over F2n
n 8 4 6 16 8 12 16 8
t 3 4 4 4 8 8 8 12
Secure (%) ≥ 33.75 ≥ 18.93 ≥ 24.96 ≥ 25.42 ≥ 12.22 ≥ 12.34 ≥ 12.78 ≥ 8.73
Discussion. Lastly, one may ask how many matrices satisfy the required property just
given. Assume an irreducible polynomial φ ∈ F[x] of degree t. Working with matrices over
Ft×tq , it is always possible to associate a companion matrix C to such a minimal polynomial,
as given in Definition 10 (the characteristic polynomial and the minimal polynomial are
equal in this case). Hence, all matrices M similar to C (i.e., all matrices M of the form
A−1 · C ·A for an invertible matrix A) satisfy Proposition 13 by construction.
For this reason, here we focus on the case of MDS matrices. We practically evaluated
the percentage of Cauchy MDS matrices which satisfy the condition given in Proposition 13.
The results are shown in Table 5. For each of the tests, we set the sample size to 10 000.
It is possible to observe that increasing the state size leads to a lower probability of the
matrix to satisfy the condition given in Proposition 13. In any case, we recall that the
condition just given is only a sufficient condition, that is, a matrix does not have to satisfy
it in order to provide security against the attacks studied in this paper.
8.2 Open Problems
As already mentioned, several problems are still open for future research. They are
summarized in the following.
• The goal of this work is to guarantee that the choice of the matrix M prevents
infinitely long subspace trails. As a next step, given a matrix for which no infinitely
long subspace trail exists, one may ask how many rounds are needed in order to
activate at least one S-box. In our practical tests regarding this issue, and when
focusing on s = 1, we observed that t+ε rounds for ε ∈ {0, 1} are in general sufficient
with high probability. We leave the open problem to find an upper bound on the
number of rounds needed for reaching this goal that depends both on (1) the details
of the matrix defining the scheme and (2) the number of S-boxes per round.
• If the analyzed S-box has a nontrivial linear structure (namely, there exist nontrivial
linear structures U ,V such that for each u there exists a certain v such that S(U+u) =
V + v), then it is potentially possible to extend the result given in this paper for the
case of active S-boxes in order to include this case as well.
• Here, we only considered the case of linear layers defined as invertible matrices over
Ft×tq . In the binary case (i.e., q = 2n), it could be interesting to extend our results
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are linearized polynomials (which can be efficiently computed over a binary field)
and where z ∈ F.
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A Truncated Differentials and Subspace Trails
Differential attacks [BS91] exploit the fact that pairs of inputs with certain differences
yield other differences in the corresponding outputs with a probability distribution that
is different from that one would expect from a random permutation. A variant of this
attack/distinguisher is the truncated differential one [Knu94], in which the attacker can
predict only part of the difference between pairs of texts. Using the subspace terminology,
given pairs of inputs that belong to the same coset of a subspace X , one considers the
probability that the corresponding outputs belong to the same coset of a subspace Y to
set up an attack (see e.g. [BLN17] for details). In particular, note that two texts x, y ∈ Ft
are in the same coset of a given subspace (i.e., there exists v ∈ Ft such that x, y ∈ V + v)
if and only if their difference belongs to such a subspace (i.e., x− y ∈ V). The relation
between truncated differential trails and subspace trails has been studied in details in
[LTW18, BLN17].
Proof of Proposition 10
As done before, in the following we omit the round keys and the constant additions (we
recall that they only change the cosets, while here we deal with differences).
The subspace trail defined over the first R rounds is already analyzed in Section 3.1.
By definition of R, at least one S-box is active after R rounds. It follows that the only







MR · S(R),M(e1), . . . ,M(es)
〉
.
Indeed, the only thing one can do is to consider the biggest subspace for which
S-box
(




e1, e2, . . . , es︸ ︷︷ ︸
Due to S-boxes
, MR · S(R)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Due to identity part
〉
.
In this way, we lose information about the output of the S-box layer (while nothing changes
for the part of the identity layer), but we can extend the subspace trail. Working in the
















M · A(r),M(e1), . . . ,M(es)
〉
.
This step can be repeated as long as the dimension of the subspace is smaller than t. Since
for a generic scheme the dimension of S(R) is s and the dimension increases by s in each






Remark. Due to the relation between subspace trails and truncated differentials [LTW18]






rounds with probability 1. We stress that the details of the construction (e.g.,
the S-box, the linear layer, the key schedule) can potentially be used to improve the





rounds refer only to the “basic” variants of such
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attacks, and this number must be considered only as a lower bound in order to provide
security. Hence, we do not discuss the minimum number of rounds necessary to provide
security against these attacks, since they strongly depend on the details of the linear layer.
B Infinitely Long Iterative Subspace Trails with Active
S-Boxes
In this section, we give the algorithm using the results described in Section 7.2.2 for a
maximum period of l = 2t.
Algorithm 3: Determining the existence of (iterative) infinitely long subspace
trails with active S-boxes of period at most l ≥ 2 based on [LMR15] and Theorem 6.
Data: P-SPN scheme over Ft with s S-boxes applied to the first s words (where
the S-box has no linear structure).
Result: 1 if (iterative) infinitely long iterative subspace trail with active S-boxes
(of period at most l ≥ 2) is found, 0 otherwise.
1 flag ← 0.
2 T ← ∅. // T stores all iterative subspace trails found
3 for r ← 2 to l do
4 foreach I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , s} (where I := {ι1, . . . , ι|I|} and I 6= ∅) do
5 Apply Algorithm 2 to Mr, and let I be the resulting “invariant” subspace
trail with active S-boxes in I, or let I = ∅ if such a trail does not exist.
// Check for a meaningful iterative subspace trail
6 if dim(I) ≥ 1 then
7 if I = M · I (i.e., the subspace trail is invariant) then
8 break (move to next r)
9 I(1) ← ∅, I(2) ← ∅, . . . , I(r−1) ← ∅.
10 for j ← 1 to r − 1 do
11 I ←M · I.
12 for i← 1 to s do
13 E(i) ← 〈e1, . . . , ei−1, ei+1, . . . , es, es+1, . . . , et〉.
14 if I ∩ E(i) 6= I (eq., I 6⊆ E(i)) then
15 if I ∩ 〈ei〉 = 〈ei〉 then
16 I(j) ← I(j) ∪ {i}.
17 else
18 break (move to next r)
19 flag ← 1.
20 T ← T ∪ {I, r, {I, I(1), I(2), . . . , I(r−1)}}.
// In the case flag = 0 (hence, T = ∅), no infinitely long
iterative subspace trail (of period ≤ l) was found.
21 return flag: infinitely long iterative subspace trails T with active S-boxes
found.
Computational Cost of Algorithm 3. We mainly focus on loop iterations for the indicator
of the final cost. First, we fix the maximum period l of the iterative non-invariant subspace
trail. Now, Algorithm 2 is run l− 1 times. After that, the next loop is iterated l′− 1 times
for each l′ ∈ {2, . . . , l}, leading to a total number of repetitions of at most l(l+1)2 . Finally,
the last loop is iterated s times. Operation costs inside these iterations are negligible. This
leads to the total runtime being an element in O (ls (2st+ l)), which is not a major issue
Lorenzo Grassi, Christian Rechberger and Markus Schofnegger 351
in the schemes we consider, since in these schemes the number of S-boxes per round (i.e.,
s) tends to be small.
Computational Cost in Practice. We used the same hardware as for the practical tests
in Section 5.2, i.e., an Intel Xeon E5-2699v4 with a maximum clock frequency of 3.60 GHz.
Again, we evaluate the performance of Algorithm 3 when using matrices over prime fields
and for n = 16, t ∈ {4, 12}, and l = 2t. For t = 4, Algorithm 3 takes about 40 milliseconds.
For t = 12, Algorithm 3 takes about 1 second.
C Results Using our Tool and More Examples of Subspace
Trails with Active S-Boxes
C.1 Starkad and Poseidon Matrices
In addition to the statistical tests described in Section 5, we also used our tool for the
Cauchy matrices using specific starting sequences defined for Starkad and Poseidon
[GKR+21]. We recall that the matrix M ′ over F2n for Starkad and the matrix M
′′ over










where xi = i, yi = i+ t, and i ∈ [0, t− 1].
Table 6: Vulnerable matrices for Algorithm 1 and orders t and field sizes n = dlog2(p)e
when considering the Starkad and Poseidon specifications.
Poseidon Specification (over Fp)
dlog2(p)e 8 4 6 16 8 12 16 8
t 3 4 4 4 8 8 8 12
Vulnerable No No No No No No No No
Starkad Specification (over F2n)
n 8 4 6 16 8 12 16 8
t 3 4 4 4 8 8 8 12
Vulnerable No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Comparison with Related Results. When using our tool for matrices with various sizes
(i.e., different values for t), we can observe that some matrices over F2n (i.e., the matrices
used for Starkad) are vulnerable to the attacks described in this paper. We can also
observe, however, that matrices over Fp using the same t values are not vulnerable. The
detailed results for some instances are shown in Table 6.
These results are not new in the literature, since similar conclusions have already been
shown in [KR21, BCD+20]. Moreover, in [KR21] the authors explain how to modify the
choice of xi and yj in Eq. (10) in order to fix this problem. This solution consists in
changing the starting sequences for the Cauchy generation method. For completeness, we
also tested our algorithm for the matrices suggested in [KR21]. As expected, we arrive at
the same conclusion, namely, that it is not possible to set up infinitely long subspace trails
without active S-boxes for the Cauchy matrices proposed in [KR21].
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C.2 Zorro Matrix
We also evaluated the Zorro [GGNPS13] matrix with our tool. Zorro is a variant of AES
where only 4 S-boxes (at the first row) are applied per round. In our setting, Zorro is
a P-SPN scheme over (F28)16 with s = 4 where the linear layer is defined by a 16 × 16
matrix, where




I 0 0 0
0 I2 0 0
0 0 I3 0
0 0 0 I4
 ,
where I is the 4× 4 identity matrix, 0 is the 4× 4 null matrix, and
I2 =

0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
 , I3 =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
 , I4 =

0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0





2 · I 3 · I I I
3 · I I I 2 · I
I I 2 · I 3 · I
I 2 · I 3 · I I
 ,
where again I is the 4× 4 identity matrix, and where 2 ≡ X ∈ F28 and 3 ≡ X + 1 ∈ F28 .
As expected, using our tool, we found that there exists no infinitely long (iterative or
invariant) subspace trail for this matrix, neither with nor without active S-boxes.13
13We recall that the statistical attacks on Zorro [WWGY14] exploit the existence of differentials with
a probability higher than what was expected by the designers, and not the existence of infinitely long
subspace trails.
